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BIFURCATION IN INTER-STATE CASES 
 
XINJUN ZHANG* 
ABSTRACT 
In the South China Sea Arbitration, China resolutely decided to 
not appear, without even appointing its own arbitrator to an 
arbitration under Annex VII of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS).  Many criticized this decision as unwise, and 
argued that the conventional litigation wisdom of contesting 
jurisdiction exclusively at the preliminary phase serves to better 
China’s interests, since it would not prejudice its decision of non-
appearance at the subsequent proceedings over merits.   
 
The validity of such a “wise” tactic rests upon bifurcation—the 
division of the proceedings into determination of jurisdiction and 
determination of merits.  Bifurcation has been routinely practiced by 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) but has not been used much 
in other forums of inter-state dispute settlement. The author 
undertakes the first investigation of 14 cases which eventually went 
to the UNCLOS arbitration (as of 2018).  It finds that the majority of 
tribunals adopted ad hoc Rules of Procedures by which the tribunals 
retained discretion on the matter of bifurcation (discretionary 
bifurcation), and in practice the tribunal’s flexibility terminates 
upon the rejection of the request to bifurcate.  In contrast, Article 79 
of the ICJ’s Rules of Court, allows the Court to adjudicate on 
questions raised within a duly submitted preliminary objection, 
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with no proceedings on the matter of bifurcation (rule-based 
bifurcation).  
 
This paper traces issues of bifurcation to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), to evaluate why and how in the ICJ 
bifurcation becomes a procedural right, finding that when rule-
based bifurcation was added to the article governing preliminary 
objections in 1926, they believed jurisdictional objections deserved 
special treatment in the Rules of Court, allowing the Court to better 
handle jurisdiction of inter-state disputes which was confined by the 
consent of the parties.  The subsequent revisions of the Rules of 
Court in 1936, 1946, 1972, 1978, and 2001 gradually but solidly 
provide that a party is entitled to bifurcation, notwithstanding a 
general belief that bifurcation reduces the Court’s efficiency. 
 
The divergence in practice may be determined by the distinctive 
nature of the two forums (adjudicative/standing court and 
arbitral/ad hoc tribunal), as judges/arbitrators balance 
jurisdictional sensitivity with procedural efficiency to decide the 
issue of bifurcation.  This paper finds that the handling of 
bifurcation in the UNCLOS arbitrations puts unwilling respondents 
in an untenable situation: participation (with appointment of its own 
arbitrator) means less jurisdictional sensitivity and probably results 
in a negative decision on bifurcation; only non-appearance of the 
unwilling respondent is thought to deserve bifurcation in which it 
can fight exclusively on jurisdiction, yet the unwilling respondent 
must deprive itself of such opportunities.   This paper argues that 
the value of rule-based bifurcation should be carefully considered, 
by which an unwilling respondent is entitled to bifurcation, thus 
allowing it to contest jurisdiction at the first place. An UNCLOS 
arbitral tribunal may ensure the legitimacy of its judgments for the 
settlement of inter-state disputes by adhering to the best practice 
firmly rooted in the PCIJ and ICJ since the 1920s. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1986 International Court of Justice (ICJ) Nicaragua case, the 
United States participated in the preliminary proceedings to defend 
its positions on jurisdiction and admissibility but withdrew its 
participation from the proceedings on the merits.1  Recently, in South 
China Sea Arbitration,2 an arbitration under Annex VII of the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 3  China’s non-
appearance was debated, and scholars argued that China should 
participate in the initial proceedings concerning the constitution of 
the tribunal and raise issues of jurisdiction at the preliminary 
objection stage.4  This view is predicated on the belief that China’s 
participation to challenge jurisdiction, like what the United States 
did in the Nicaragua case, would not prejudice its non-appearance at 
the subsequent proceedings over merits.5  However, the validity of 
this tactic rests upon bifurcation—a term commonly used in the field 
of procedure to mean the division of the proceedings into 
determination of jurisdiction and determination of merits. 6  
 
 1 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, para. 10 (June 27). 
 2  South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016). 
 3 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 4 See Jiangyu Wang, 国际法、国际关系与国家利益视角下的南海仲裁案 [The 
International Law, International Relations and National Interest Concerns from 
Chinese Perspective], 6 ASIA-PAC. SEC. & MAR. AFF., 1, 13 (2016); see also Bing Ling, 
Speech at Fudan University: Why China’s Rejection is Against Its Own Interests 
(Dec. 2016), 
http://www.uscnpm.com/model_item.html?action=view&table=article&id=7961 
[https://perma.cc/LP6G-GGQN].  See generally Julian Ku, China’s Legal Scholars Are 
Less Credible After South China Sea Ruling, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 14, 2016), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/14/south-china-sea-lawyers-unclos-beijing-
legal-tribunal/ [https://perma.cc/F97P-SGJ6] (providing an overview of Chinese 
academics’ opinions on China’s non-appearance and possible participation in the 
initial arbitration proceedings). 
 5 See Jiangyu Wang, Legitimacy, Jurisdiction and Merits in the South China Sea 
Arbitration: Chinese Perspectives and International Law, 22 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 185, 200 
(2017) (arguing that China “would have been in a much better position on the legal 
front had it formally participated in the case from the jurisdictional stage”). 
 6  See Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs, [hereinafter Rules of Court] 
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/rules [https://perma.cc/DT7C-2XH6].  Bifurcation 
may also involve determination of liability and determination of quantum of 
compensation or damages award.  Bifurcation in this paper refers to the former 
concept of division of the proceedings, in which an international judicial organ 
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Bifurcation is a procedural response to questions of jurisdiction 
and/or admissibility, normally raised in the form of the preliminary 
objection.  With bifurcation, the said questions will be adjudicated 
in a separate proceeding with a judgement or award at its closure. 
The word bifurcation does not appear in the ICJ Statute or its 
Rules of Court. 7   However, upon receipt of a duly submitted 
preliminary objection, Article 79 of the Rules of Court on 
preliminary objections explicitly provides for suspension of the 
proceedings on the merits,8 and instead sets up a written proceeding 
addressing objections.9  It is followed by a default oral hearing on 
the preliminary objection.10  Eventually, the preliminary objection is 
disposed of in the form of judgment.11  Thus, a party in front of the 
ICJ is entitled to obtain self-contained proceedings on jurisdiction 
and admissibility under the Rules of Court.12  Indeed, the party’s 
procedural right to bifurcation has been gradually affirmed since the 
era of the Permanent Court of Justice (PCIJ, the predecessor of the 
ICJ), notwithstanding that the Court retains an inherent power to 
handle its own procedure regarding jurisdiction,13 and in practice 
the Court exercises its inherent power in no derogation of such a 
right.14 
 
treats jurisdiction and admissibility of claims as discrete issues in a distinct or 
separate proceeding before further resolution of the merits of claims. 
 7 See id. 
 8 Id. art. 79(5). 
 9 Id. art. 79(5). 
 10 Id. art. 79(6). 
 11 Id. art. 79(9). 
 12 Id. art. 79. 
 13 Statute of the Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs. (I.C.J. Statute), http://www.icj-
cij.org/en/statute [https://perma.cc/DR4L-D97A].  The procedure concerning 
preliminary objections as whole (and the matter of bifurcation being part of it) in 
principle falls into the inherent power of the Court as part of the management of 
the legal proceedings, by virtue of the necessity to determine issues of jurisdiction 
based on the principle of la compétence de la competence (art. 36(6)) and its power to 
“make orders for the conduct of the case” (art. 48).  See also SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE 
LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 1920-2005 810 (4th ed. 2006) 
(concluding that “through those two provisions of the Statute the Court can deal 
with any matter that might arise as to whether it has jurisdiction in a case or 
whether the case as a whole or a particular claim is admissible.”). 
 14 Indeed, in the Nicaragua case, the Court decided to bifurcate proceedings 
without waiting for further submission of a preliminary objection. For further 
discussion on this point, see infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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Many of the law of the sea disputes were brought pursuant to 
the “default” arbitration under UNCLOS Annex VII 15  and have 
made it one of the important legal battlefields for inter-state dispute 
since the UNCLOS entered into force in 1994.16  In these cases, we 
see the word “bifurcation” has been invariably used in ad hoc 
tribunals’ Rules of Procedure.   However, by the time this paper was 
written, there were 14 Annex VII arbitral cases; the proceedings 
were bifurcated in only four of them.17   The tribunals’ Rules of 
Procedure in the majority of Annex VII arbitrations were developed 
by ad hoc tribunals under the influence of the Model Rules of 
Procedure of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA, serving as 
Registrar in these cases but more frequently used by international 
commercial arbitrations), by which the tribunal retains discretion on 
the matter of bifurcation (discretionary bifurcation).18 
Unfortunately, in this very important forum for inter-state 
dispute settlement we see the resurgence of non-appearance by 
responding states 19 —apart from the aforesaid China’s non-
 
 15  See UNCLOS, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 at art. 287(3) (noting that when no 
preference has been stated regarding the means of dispute resolution under art. 
287(1), the other two default forums are the ICJ ITLOS); see also id. art. 287(5) (noting 
the default if the Parties have not accepted the same procedure available under art. 
287(1)). 
 16 Since UNCLOS came into force in 1994 to 2018, 14 cases have been referred 
to Annex VII arbitration and adjudicated, making it the most common means of 
resolution of key UNCLOS disputes.  In contrast, 15 out of the 23 ITLOS contentious 
cases are requests for prompt release or requests for provisional measures pending 
the constitution of an Annex VII arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS art. 290(5).  In the 
remaining seven “normal” cases, five are those initiated by a Party State under 
Annex VII but subsequently transferred to the ITLOS under “Special Agreement” 
reached by the Parties. 
 17  See Southern Bluefin Tuna (Austl. v. Japan), 23 R.I.A.A. 1, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2000); The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Neth. 
v. Russ.), Case No. 2014-02, Award on Jurisdiction (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014); South 
China Sea Arbitration, Case No. 2013-19 (bifurcation was decided by the tribunals 
without the participation of the respondent states); Dispute Concerning Coastal 
State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 
2017-06, Procedural Order No.3 Regarding Bifurcation of the Proceedings, 3 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 2017).  For details, see infra Part 3. 
 18 See UNCLOS, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 at Annex VII, art. 5 (“Unless the parties to 
the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitral tribunal shall determine its own procedure, 
assuring to each party a full opportunity to be heard and to present its case”).  For 
discretionary bifurcation stipulated in the Annex VII tribunals’ Rules of Procedure 
and influence from Model Rules of Procedure of PCA, see infra note 117 and 
accompanying text. 
 19 Non-appearance of the respondent state occurred frequently in the 1970s 
and 1980s in the ICJ Cases of non-appearance (except for non-appearance only at 
Provisional Measures) include: Icelandic Fisheries (U.K. v. Ice.; Germ. v. Ice.), 
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appearance in South China Sea Arbitration, Russia also declined to 
participate into the proceedings of the Arctic Sunrise arbitration.20 
A less heeded phenomenon that indicates unwillingness of the 
respondents vis-à-vis Annex VII arbitration is the moderate rate of 
deviation to this “default” procedure—besides the 14 cases which 
eventually went to the Annex VII arbitration, there were five cases 
initiated under Annex VII arbitration that were subsequently 
transferred by “Special Agreement” to the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), or its special chamber.21  Significantly, 
ITLOS introduced the rule-based bifurcation into its Rules of the 
Tribunal.22 
 
Nuclear Tests (NZ v. Austl.; Austl. v. Fr.), Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. 
Turkey), United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) and 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S) (the 
United States refused to appear in the merits phase).  In the 1950s there were two 
cases of non-appearance: Corfu Channel (U.K. of Gr. Brit. & N. Ir. v. Alb.) (Albania 
did not appear at the stage on reparation); Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.) (the 
respondent did not appear in the preliminary phase).  See generally J.B. ELKIND, NON-
APPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1985); H.W.A. THIRLWAY, 
NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1985) (exploring 
the concept, procedure, and remedies for non-appearances); Ian Sinclair, Some 
Procedural Aspects of Recent International Litigation 30 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 338 (1981) 
(reviewing historical and contemporary instances of non-appearance); James D. 
Fry, Non-Participation in the International Court of Justice Revisited: Change or Plus Ça 
Change? 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 35 (2011) (challenging the notion that the 
Nicaragua case was the last instance of non-appearance at the I.C.J.); Jonathan I. 
Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the Court: Problems of Non-
Appearance, Non-Participation, and Non-Performance, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987) 288 (expanding on the 
problems faced by international tribunals with respect to non-appearance by 
recalcitrant states); S.A. Alexandrov, Non-Appearance before the International Court of 
Justice 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 41 (1995) (asserting that the reason for Article 53 
of the I.C.J. Statute is to allow the court to function in the event of non-appearance). 
 20 Chao Zhang & Yen-Chiang Chang, The Russian Federation Refuses to Appear 
Before the ITLOS and the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal, 14 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 405 (2015). 
 21 M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Order of July 1, 1999, 
2 ITLOS Rep. 17, para. 5; Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish 
Stocks (Chile v. European Cmty.), Case No. 7, Order of Dec. 20, 2000, ITLOS Rep. 
153, para. 6 (transferred to the ITLOS Special Chamber); M/V “Virginia G” (Pan. v. 
Guinea-Bissau), Case No. 19, Judgment of Apr. 14, 2014, ITLOS Rep. 9, para. 6; 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the 
Bay of Bengal (Bangl. v. Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, ITLOS 
Rep. 12, para. 5; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of 
Sept. 23, 2017, para. 11 (transferred to the ITLOS Special Chamber), 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/C2
3_Judgment_23.09.2017_corr.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6M9-W6AQ]. 
 22 Rules of the Tribunal (ITLOS/8), as adopted on Oct. 28, 1997 and amended 
on Mar. 15, 2001, Sept. 21, 2001 and Mar. 17, 2009, art. 97, 
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In this regard, it is of interest to observe Russia’s position in the 
pending Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of 
Azov, and Kerch Strait, the second case in which Russia was brought 
to Annex VII arbitration. 23   Notwithstanding Russia’s non-
appearance in Arctic Sunrise and speculation that Russia might not 
appear in the case at hand, 24 Russia elected to appoint arbitrator(s) 
for the purpose of disputing jurisdiction.25  Presently, it appears that 
Russia will participate and contest jurisdiction in a preliminary 
proceeding.  Significantly, the tribunal’s Rules of Procedure applied 
in that case, unlike those employed by the majority of Annex VII 
tribunals, contain a provision on preliminary objection 
incorporating elements of Article 79 of the ICJ Rules of Court, under 
which Russia is allegedly entitled to bifurcation.26 
All of which seem to suggest that, notwithstanding their position 
that refusal to appear is political in nature,27 there is a space for 
 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/basic_texts/Itlos_8_E_17_03
_09.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3C5-EK3G].  This Article on Preliminary Objections 
retains the major elements of Article 79 of the ICJ Rules of Court (suspension of 
proceedings on the merits, written and oral proceedings on preliminary objections 
and a wrap-up judgement).  However, it requires that the objections shall be made 
“within 90 days from the institution of proceedings”—which is a much shorter time 
frame than the ICJ’s requirement of “three months after the delivery of the 
Memorial.”  Presently, 15 out of the 23 contentious ITLOS cases are requests for 
prompt release or requests for provisional measures pending the constitution of an 
Annex VII arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS art. 290(5).  In the other seven cases in 
which art. 97 of Rules of the Tribunal (ITLOS/8) may be applied, five were 
transferred to the ITLOS by “Special Agreement”, under which circumstance a 
party is less likely to raise preliminary objections.  So far only in the unilaterally 
initiated M/V “Norstar” (Pan. v. Italy) has the respondent filed objections within 
90 days from the institution of proceedings and the ITLOS bifurcated the 
proceedings according to art. 97.  See M/V “Norstar” (Pan. v. It.), Case No. 25, 
Preliminary Objections, Judgement of Nov. 4, 2016, paras. 15-16, 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.25/Preliminar
y_Objections/Judgment/C25_Judgment_04.11.16_orig.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UG9U-RU2R]. 
 23 Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and 
Kerch Strait (Ukr. V. Russ.), Case No. 2017-06 (Perm. Ct. Arb., pending since 2016). 
 24 Julian Ku, As Ukraine Prepares to Take Russia to UNCLOS Arbitration Over 
Crimea, I Predict Russia’s Likely Reaction, OPINIOJURIS (Jan. 2, 2016), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2016/02/01/ukraine-prepares-to-take-russia-to-unclos-
arbitration [https://perma.cc/YLJ3-5QKU]. 
 25 PCA Press Release, Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black 
Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.), First Procedural Meeting in 
Arbitration Under the Law of Sea Convention, (May 22, 2017). 
 26 For details, see infra Part 3. 
 27  SHABTAI ROSENNE, WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 94-95 
(1989). 
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unwilling states to exercise conventional litigation tactics as the 
United States did in the Nicaragua case (and possibly for Russia to 
follow in the pending Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait case).  
Since the validity rests upon bifurcation, it requires a thorough 
investigation of the practice and the judicial policy behind it.  A 
comparison of the ICJ’s Rules of Court and Annex VII tribunals’ 
Rules of Procedure, as well as their practice on the matter of 
bifurcation, should be of interest to international lawyers. 
This Paper contains three parts.  Part Two will observe the 
evolution of the rule-based bifurcation in the PCIJ and ICJ, 
concluding that under Article 79 of the Rules of Court, this rule-
based approach to bifurcation is clearly resolved in the modern 
Rules of Court.  Part Three lays out all 14 cases of the Annex VII 
Arbitration (as of 2018), putting them into three categories of 
practice to bifurcation.  It compares circumstances in each category 
of the cases and explains how the tribunals would in general 
maintain flexibility with respect to bifurcation under the Rules of 
Procedure.  It then demonstrates how non-bifurcation became the 
routine practice, but bifurcation is possible under certain 
circumstances of non-appearance and agreement.  Part Four 
explores the policy behind the divergence of bifurcation practice 
between ICJ and Annex VII arbitral tribunals.  The divergence in 
practice may be determined by the distinctive nature of the two 
forums (adjudicative and arbitral) as they decide the issue of 
bifurcation, balancing jurisdictional sensitivity against procedural 
efficiency.  It concludes that the value of rule-based bifurcation 
should be carefully considered, by which an Annex VII arbitral 
tribunal may ensure the legitimacy of its judgments for the 
settlement of inter-state disputes by adhering to the best practice 
firmly established by the PCIJ and ICJ. 
2. BIFURCATION AS A PROCEDURAL RIGHT FOR THE PARTY RAISING 
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS: THE EVALUATION OF RULES ON 
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION IN THE PCIJ AND THE ICJ 
In the preparation of the Rules of Court in early 1922, the Court 
discussed various issues surrounding the draft article on 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
946 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:4 
preliminary objections with regard to jurisdiction.  A vote was taken, 
and this draft article was omitted in the second reading of the draft.28 
2.1. Early practice of the Permanent Court and the making of the rule 
on “preliminary objections” in Article 38 of the Rules of Court 
(1926) 
Although the 1922 Rules contain no provisions on preliminary 
objections, in the 1924 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, the 
respondent, the United Kingdom, informed the Court that it 
intended to raise preliminary objections to the Court’s jurisdiction 
immediately after the applicant, Greece, filed its case (Memorial) 
with the Court.29  In agreement with the respondent, the President 
fixed the date for the filing of the objection. 30   The applicant 
requested permission to make a written reply to this objection, 
which was permitted, and the date for filing the reply was fixed.  In 
a separate jurisdictional judgment, the Court upheld the preliminary 
objection relating to the claim in respect of the works at Jaffa, and 
dismissed objections relating to the claim in respect of the works at 
Jerusalem.31 
The second instance in which preliminary objections were raised 
when the Rules of Court were silent on the matter occurred in the 
1925 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case.32  There, the 
respondent, the Polish government, filed its case (Memorial), raising 
certain preliminary objections in anticipation of the applicant 
German government’s first pleading.33  The applicant then on the 
fixed date filed a “Counter-Case” (Counter-memorial) in reply to the 
Polish preliminary objections. 34   Public hearings relating to the 
 
 28 Preparation of the Rules of Court of January 30th, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 
2, at 213-14, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-
justice/serie_D/D_02_preparation_reglement.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8BN-
UQJS]. 
 29 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) 
No. 3 (Aug. 30), at 9. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 36. 
 32  Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germ. v. Pol.), 1925 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6 (Aug. 25). 
 33 Id. at 6-7. 
 34 Id. at 7. 
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question of jurisdiction were arranged accordingly.35  The Court in 
a separate jurisdictional judgment dismissed Poland’s preliminary 
objections.36 
Based on the experience in these two cases, the Permanent Court 
adopted a new Article 38 concerning preliminary objections in the 
Rules of Court of 1926, which contains four paragraphs.37  The first 
two paragraphs set out the timing for submission and the contents 
of preliminary objections.  These two basic elements of qualification 
for “preliminary objections” have been maintained but 
subsequently modified as a result of the practice of the Court.38  
Once the preliminary objections are submitted, the Court establishes 
deadlines for response and oral arguments on the preliminary 
objection, as set out in paragraphs 3 and 4: 
(3) Upon receipt by the Registrar of the document submitting 
the objection, the Court, or the President if the Court is not 
sitting, shall fix the time within which the party against 
whom the plea is directed may submit a written statement of 
its observations and conclusions; documents in support shall 
be attached and evidence which it is proposed to produce 
shall be mentioned. 
(4) Further proceedings shall be oral unless otherwise 
decided by the Court. The provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 
of Article 69 of the Rules shall apply.39 
No explicit reference is made to the preliminary objection 
resolution’s impact on the underlying proceeding.  Moreover, there 
is no provision in the Rules governing how the Court will dispose 
of preliminary objections.  However, in the course of discussing the 
drafting of Article 38, the possibility that the Court might join the 
question of jurisdiction to the merits was widely contemplated.40  In 
 
 35 Id. at 7. 
 36 Id. at 27. 
 37  Statute and Rules of Court, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1, at 50-51, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-
justice/serie_D/D_01_1e_edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y45Z-JMT8]. 
 38 See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
 39 Statute and Rules of Court, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1. supra note 37.  The 
last sentence of paragraph 4 refers to the Chamber of Summary Procedure, which 
was omitted in 1936. 
 40  Annual Report from 1926-1927, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 3, at 199, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-
justice/serie_E/English/E_03_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EP4-7PE2]. 
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the 1933 Prince von Pless Administration case, applying this new 
Article 38, the Court in the form of an order did in fact join the 
preliminary objection to the merits.41  This issue was addressed in 
the subsequent revision of the Rules of Court. 
2.2. Further indication of the consequence of preliminary objections: 
Rules of Court 1936/1946/1972/1978 and the 2001 Modification 
In the “general revision” of the Rules of Court from 1931 to 1936, 
Article 38 was revised and adopted as Article 62 in the Rules of 
Court of 1936.42   The draft article prepared by the Coordination 
Committee introduced a new paragraph 5 to reflect the past practice 
of the Permanent Court in the disposal of the preliminary objection, 
stating  “[w]hen the parties have been heard, the Court may decide 
on the objection, or may join the objection to the merits, or may take 
such other decision in regard to it as it considers just.”43 
In the first reading, the last clause “or may take such other 
decision . . . “ was deleted as it could be misunderstood that the 
Court needed not to consider the objection,44 and the word “may” 
was substituted by “shall.”45  Indeed, in the course of discussion on 
the drafting of Article 38 of the 1926 Rules, Judge Anzilotti had 
already suggested that unwarranted confusion should be avoided.46  
In the last reading of Article 62 (March 5, 1936), it was noted that in 
order to implement paragraph 5, a decision to overrule preliminary 
objections or to join consideration of these objections to the merits 
would require the Court to reset the time limit for the main 
 
 41 Prince von Pless Administration (Ger. v. Pol.), Order of 4 February, 1933 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 52, at 16. 
 42  Revised Statute and Rules of Court, 1940 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1, at 53, 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-
justice/serie_D/D_01_4e_edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJK8-YBXU]. 
 43 Elaboration of the Rules of Court of March 11, 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) third 
addendum to No. 2, at 85, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-
international-justice/serie_D/D_02_3e_addendum.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6X2-
NGNU]. 
 44 Id. at 95. 
 45 Id. at 150. 
 46 Acts and Documents concerning the Organization of the Court, 1926 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. D) Addendum to No. 2, at 83, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-
courtofinternationaljustice/serie_D/D_02_acts_and_doc_serie_d_add_to_n2.pdf. 
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proceedings. 47   This revealed a gap in Article 62 regarding the 
procedural response to the submission of preliminary objections.  
Accordingly, “the proceedings on the merits shall be suspended” 
was inserted into paragraph 3, and the newly added paragraph 5, as 
rephrased, reads: 
After hearing the parties the Court shall give its decision on 
the objection or shall join the objection to the merits. If the 
Court overrules the objection or joins it to the merits, it shall 
once more fix time-limits for the further proceedings.48 
In the practice of the Court, the decision envisaged in paragraph 
5 may be rendered in the form of a judgment either to uphold or 
overrule the preliminary objections,49 or in the form of an order to 
join the consideration of the preliminary objection to the merits.50  
The Court gave individual case numbers to these judgments and 
orders.  In doing so, the Court was clearly of the view that the 
proceedings on an objection should be treated as an entirely separate 
case.51 
The 1946 Rules retained Article 62 of the 1936 Rules with slight 
refinements in language.52   The ICJ’s post-1946 practice led to a 
major revision in 1972, in which the article on “preliminary 
objections” was renumbered as Article 67, 53  with paragraphs 
 
 47 Elaboration of the Rules of Court of March 11, 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) third 
addendum to No. 2. 
 48 Id. at 707-708. 
 49 Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. Fr.), 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 74 (June 
14); Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belg. v. Bulg.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A/B) No. 77 (Order of Apr. 4); Borchgrave (Spain v. Belg.) 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) 
No. 72 (Nov. 6). 
 50 Pajzs, Csáky, Esterhazy (Hung. v. Yugo.), 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 66 
(Order of May 23); Losinger & Co. (Switz. v. Yugo.), 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 67 
(Order of June 27); Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Est. v. Lith.), 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A/B) No. 75 (Order of June 30). 
 51  Annual Report from 1939-1945, 1945 P.C.I.J. (ser. E) No. 16, at 190, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-
justice/serie_E/English/E_16_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJR5-JRD2] (“It was held 
that the proceedings on an objection, even when resulting in the joinder of the 
objection to the merits, could be regarded as a separate case, no matter they were 
terminated by a judgement or by an order.”). 
 52 Rules of Court adopted on 6 May 1946. I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No. 1 (second 
ed.), at 74-75. 
 53 Rules of Court came into force on 1 September 1972. I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No. 
3, at 133-135. 
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revised and added.54  Paragraph 5 of Article 62 of the 1946 Rules was 
revised and renumbered as paragraph 7 of Article 67: 
After hearing the parties, the Court shall give its decision in 
the form of judgment, by which it shall either uphold the 
objection, reject it, or declare that the objection does not 
possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively 
preliminary character. If the Court rejects the objection or 
declares that it does not possess an exclusively preliminary 
character joins it to the merits, it shall once more fix time-
limits for the further proceedings.55 
This new rule for disposal of preliminary objections made two 
fundamental changes.  First, it excludes the option of “shall join the 
objection to the merits” and instead forces the Court to rule on the 
matter for or against, or alternatively declare that “the objection does 
not possess an exclusively preliminary character.” 56   Second, it 
explicitly requires that the Court dispose of the objection in the form 
of a judgment.57  The rendering of a judgment is said to correspond 
to the practice of the ICJ and is commonly regarded as appropriate 
in view of the importance of such a decision on the preliminary 
objection.58  Although the ICJ’s post-1946 practice no longer offers 
an individual case number in disposing of a preliminary objection, 
the 1972 revision rather enhanced the Court’s procedure that the 
preliminary objection is to be dealt with as an entirely separate case 
distinct from the proceeding on the merits. 
The eight paragraphs in Article 67 of the 1972 Rules were 
retained with minor drafting changes in Article 79 of the Rules of 
1978.59  In the modification of Article 79 in 2001, paragraph 1 was 
replaced by new paragraphs 1 to 3, and the former paragraphs 2 to 
8 were retained unchanged and renumbered as paragraphs 4 to 10.60  
In the application of Article 79, the Court held that “by raising 
 
 54  See id. (rewriting paragraph 1 (timing, etc.), retaining paragraph 2 
(contents), retaining paragraphs 3 and 4 except for technical changes, and adding 
new paragraphs 5, 6 and 8). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of 
the International Court of Justice 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 20 (1973) (stating the 
appropriateness of the requirement for the final decision on the preliminary 
objection to be in the form of a judgment). 
 59 Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 
 60 Id. 
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preliminary objections, it has made a procedural choice the effect of 
which, according to the express terms of Article 79, paragraph 3 
[Rules of 1978], is to suspend the proceedings on the merits.”61 
Although the procedural choice suspends proceedings on the 
merits, the choice to object carries its own requirements that 
proceedings on the objection must be submitted timely and in 
accordance with the Rules.  The content and form of preliminary 
objection were first specified in Paragraph 2 of Article 38 of the 1926 
Rules,62 and the provision has been retained in subsequent revisions 
with only technical changes.63  In the practice of the PCIJ, the Court 
admitted that the preliminary objection was to be submitted in a 
counter-memorial addressing both the preliminary objection and 
points of argument on merits;64 it declined to condition the validity 
of the objection on adherence to rigid formality.65 
In the Nottebohm case, the non-appearing respondent sent a 
communication, prior to its time limit for the filing of a counter-
memorial, challenging the jurisdiction of the Court.66  The Court, 
without invoking the Rules of Court on the preliminary objection, 
nevertheless determined that a preliminary objection had been 
raised in the aforesaid communication. Consequently, the Court 
proceeded to examine only this preliminary objection and rendered 
a judgment concerning it alone.67  In the second application of the 
Barcelona Traction case, the Court clarified the effect of the filing of 
the preliminary objection under the Rules as it gave “broad powers” 
 
 61  Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal 
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
v. U.S.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. 134-35, para. 51. 
 62 Statute and Rules of Court, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1, at 51 (“The document 
submitting the objection shall contain a statement of facts and of law on which the 
plea is based, a statement of conclusions and a list of the documents in support; 
these documents shall be attached; it shall mention the evidence which the party 
may desire to produce.”). 
 63  Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs, Paragraph 4, art. 79 of the 2001. 
Amendment states, “The preliminary objection shall set out the facts and the law 
on which the objection is based, the submissions and a list of the documents in 
support; it shall mention any evidence which the party may desire to produce. 
Copies of the supporting documents shall be attached.” 
 64 Pajzs‚ Csáky‚ Esterházy (Preliminary Objection: Order of 23 May 1936), supra 
note 50, at 7. 
 65 Losinger (Preliminary Objection: Order of 27 June 1936), supra note 50, at 18-
19. 
 66 Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Preliminary Objection, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. 118 
(Nov. 18). 
 67 Id. 
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to the respondents, stating that “merely by labelling and filing a plea 
as a preliminary objection they automatically bring about the 
suspension of the proceedings on the merits.”68  The consequence is 
that the Court will set a hearing under paragraph 5 of Article 62 of 
the 1946 Rules and give consideration to its objection before 
requiring a response on the merits.69 
In contrast to form, timing is the defining factor as to whether a 
plea constitutes a “preliminary” objection.  The timing issue was 
recognized as early as the drafting of the Rules of Court in 1922.70  
Although the drafting judges failed to adopt any proposal for a rule 
on the preliminary objection, there was a consensus among the 
judges that objections to jurisdiction should be made as soon as 
possible.71  The article on the preliminary objection (Article 38) of the 
1926 Rules requires that a preliminary objection shall be filed after 
the filing of the case (memorial) by the applicant and within the time 
fixed for the filing of the counter-case (counter-memorial).72  In the 
revised Rules of 1936, the starting point, “the filing of the Case 
[Memorial]” was omitted, and the rule simply stated that 
preliminary objection must be filed before the deadline for the 
counter-memorial.73  The issue of whether preliminary objections 
can be submitted before the applicant files a memorial is less 
controversial and appears to be settled in the affirmative.74  The time 
 
 68 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1964 I.C.J. Rep. 6 (July 24) (citing paragraph 3 of 
Article 62). 
 69 Id. at paras. 9-10. 
 70 Preparation of the Rules of Court of January 30th, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 
2, at 78, 149, 151, 202. 
 71 Id. 
 72  Statute and Rules of Court, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1, at 50. (“When 
proceedings are begun by means of an application, any preliminary objection shall 
be filed after the filing of the Case [Memorial] by the applicant and within the time 
fixed for the filing of the Counter-Case [Counter-Memorial].”). 
 73 Elaboration of the Rules of Court of March 11, 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) third 
addendum to No. 2, at 1015.  Paragraph 1 of Article 62 of the 1936 Rules states, “A 
preliminary objection must be field at the latest before the expiry of the time-limit 
fixed for the filing by the party submitting the objection of the first document of the 
written proceedings to be filed by that party.”  It is noted that in the practice of PCIJ 
prior to the 1926 Rules of Court, the jurisdictional objections were raised in the early 
stage in both the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, supra note 29, and 
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case, supra note 32, with a 
difference that objection was made subsequent to the filing of Memorial in the 
former case but before in the latter case. 
 74 In the ICJ, the early submission of a preliminary objection is absolutely 
proper.  See Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), Order of 13 December 1989, 
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limit for the submission of a preliminary objection has been 
redefined in the subsequent revision of the Rules of Court; the latest 
modification of Article 79 (2001) defines the closing point to be three 
months after the delivery of the Memorial or the delivery of a party’s 
first pleading.75 
Objections submitted after the time limit, under the Rules of 
Court in force at the time, could not be accepted as properly 
submitted preliminary objections, and would not have suspensory 
effect on the main proceedings.76  Objections submitted before the 
filing of the memorial—no longer a matter of restriction since the 
Revision of Rules of Court in 1936—literally will also not have the 
effect of suspension of the main proceedings since the latter has not 
commenced. 77   However, the word suspension may be used 
invariably as the Court did in the Certain German Interests in Polish 
Upper Silesia case;78 the real meaning in this context is to indicate that 
there will be an immediate and separate stage for the examination 
of preliminary objections.79 
The Court’s attention to jurisdiction may also be caught at the 
very early stage, e.g., simultaneously with the request for 
 
I.C.J. Rep. 134 (“Whereas, in accordance with Article 79, paragraph 1, of the Rules 
of Court, while a respondent which wishes to submit a preliminary objection is 
entitled before doing so to be informed as to the nature of the claim by the 
submission of a Memorial by the Applicant, it may nevertheless file its objection 
earlier.”). 
 75 Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs, art. 79. 
 76 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 
Rep. 29, para. 24 (Mar. 31) (stating that the respondent filed its “preliminary 
objections” more than four months after Mexico’s filing of its Memorial, and 
therefore raised an issue concerning the three-month rule under art. 79(1) (2001 
Modification).  The Court was of the view that “a party failing to avail itself of the 
Article 79 procedure may forfeit the right to bring about a suspension of the 
proceedings.”).  See also Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council 
(India v. Pak.), Judgment, 1972 I.C.J. Rep. 53, para. 13 (Aug. 18) (stating no 
preliminary procedure in this case, as “the objections were not put forward . . .  as 
‘preliminary’ objections under Article 62 of the Court’s Rules (1946 edition).”).  The 
Court was of the view that “[i]t is certainly to be desired that objections to the 
jurisdiction of the Court should be put forward as preliminary objections for a 
separate decision in advance of the proceedings on the merits.”). 
 77 ROSENNE, supra note 13, at 805.  See also Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 
Interim Protection Order, 1972 I.C.J. Rep. 12 (Aug. 17) (joint dissenting opinion of 
Judges Bengzon and Jiménez de Aréchag). 
 78  See Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Preliminary 
Objections: Judgement), supra note 32, at 15 (indicating that the consequence of the 
objection was to suspend the proceedings on the merits of the suit, therefore it must 
proceed to the preliminary objection). 
 79 ROSENNE, supra note 13, at 805. 
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provisional measures, as the respondent challenges prima facie 
jurisdiction on the merits of the dispute.  However, it is not required, 
and the respondent states would not be able to formulate a formal 
preliminary objection due to urgency for such a request.  In the 
Interhandle case, the respondent (United States) in the provisional 
measure phase filed a one-page brief titled “Preliminary Objection,” 
referencing Article 62 of the 1946 Rules of Court governing 
preliminary objections, and reserved its right to file separate further 
preliminary objections.80   This filing did not, however, have the 
effect of automatically suspending the main proceedings until the 
United States further submitted four preliminary objections with 
appendices containing supporting exhibits.81 
More challenging for the Court are cases of non-appearance in 
which the Court’s attention to jurisdiction was caught by objections 
raised in the provisional measure phase through so-called extra-
procedural communications.82   This occurred in several cases of 
non-appearance in the 1970s and 1980s.  In the case of United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the Court found in the 
provisional measures phase that it was manifest from the 
information before the Court that the jurisdiction of the Court could 
 
 80 Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), Interim Measures, 1957 I.C.J. Rep.107 (Oct. 24). 
 81 See id. at 123 (failing to mention Article 62 of the Rules of Court, the Court 
fixed time limits for the filing of the memorial, counter memorial or any preliminary 
objections of the United States.  The United Stated filed within the time limit four 
preliminary objections with appendixes of a list of exhibits); see also Interhandel 
(Switz. v. U.S.), Order, 1958 I.C.J. Rep. 32 (June 26) (referencing Article 62 of the 
Rules of Court, fixed the time limit for the applicant to present a written statement 
of its observations and submissions in regard to the preliminary objections).  Two 
reasons may be considered as to why the initial one-page filing in the stage of 
provisional measures did not trigger immediate suspension: (1) the main 
proceeding has not commenced and (2) the United States explicitly reserved the 
right to file separate further preliminary objections. 
 82 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, para. 27 (June 27) (announcing in each and 
every case that non-appearance was regretful. In no case did the Court declare 
extra-procedural communications invalid, or sanction the act of non-appearance); 
see also Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. Rep. 
18, para. 42 (Dec. 19) (stating that the Court must take into account all the elements 
before it, including the non-appearing party’s extra-procedural communication.  In 
doing so the Court explicitly referred to Article 53 of the Statute of the Court.); but 
cf. Sir G. Fitzmaurice, The Problem of the “Non-Appearing” Defendant Government 51 
BRITISH YEARBOOK INT’L L. 89, 120-21 (1980) (examining the problem of the “non-
appearing” defendant through ICJ cases and concluding that it may bring the 
court’s obligatory jurisdiction into disrepute; speaking against the practice of non-
appearance and suggesting that in managing procedural matters the Court shall 
not take judicial cognizance of extra-procedural communications). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss4/5
2019] Bifurcation in Inter-State Cases 955 
be established.83  In Fisheries Jurisdiction, Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of 
War, Nuclear Tests, and Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, the Court 
determined in its orders that the first pleadings should be addressed 
to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the 
dispute, with fixed time-limits for the submission of pleadings for 
that purpose.84 
In these orders, no reference was made to the article governing 
preliminary objections in the Rules of Court then in force, similar to 
the practice of the court in the Nottebohm case.85  The first order of 
this kind was made in the 1972 Fisheries Jurisdiction case, when the 
then applicable Article 62 in the 1946 Rules of Court was undergoing 
a modification during the course of the adjudication to require the 
submission of objections to be made in the form of “pleadings.”86  
The Court later ruled in its Judgments on Preliminary Objections 
that a non-appearing party’s extra-procedural communications 
could not be treated as a “pleading” under the Rules of Court.87  
While in the Nottebohm case, the extra-procedural communication 
was submitted prior to its time limit for the filing of a counter-
memorial and the Court recognized that preliminary objection had 
 
 83 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 
Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. Rep. 14, para. 18 (Dec. 15) (stating that the Court 
only ordered that the case should proceed according to its normal course, i.e., 
memorial of the United States is to be filed first and the counter-memorial of Iran 
second); see also U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 
Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 24, para. 45 (May 24) (discussing how the objections from 
Iran were examined in the main proceedings and decided in the judgment on 
merits). 
 84 See generally Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Order, 1972, I.C.J. Rep. 182 
(Aug. 18); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), Order, 1972, I.C.J. Rep. 189 (Aug. 18); 
Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pak. v. India), Order, 1973 I.C.J. Rep. 330 (July 
13); Nuclear Tests (Aust. v. Fr.), Order, 1973 I.C.J. Rep. 106 (June 22); Nuclear Tests 
(N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1973 I.C.J Rep. 142 (June 22); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
(Greece v. Turkey), Order, 1976 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (Sept. 11); Aegean Sea Continental 
Shelf (Greece v. Turkey) Order, 1976 I.C.J. Rep. 43 (Oct. 14) (providing in its orders 
that the first pleadings should first address the Court’s own jurisdiction within 
certain time limits). 
 85 Nottebohm, supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 86 See supra note 53, (quoting Article 67 (5) of the 1972 Rules of Court: “The 
statements of fact and law in the pleadings referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, 
and the statements and evidence presented at the hearings contemplated by 
paragraph 4, shall be confined to those matters that are relevant to the objection.”). 
 87 See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Jurisdiction of the Court, 1973 I.C.J. 
Rep. 6, ¶ 10 (Feb. 2); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), Jurisdiction of the Court, 
1973 I.C.J. Rep. 54, ¶ 13 (Feb. 2).  The Court affirmed this point in a subsequent case 
of non-appearance; see also Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), 
Questions of Jurisdiction and/or Admissibility, 1978 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶ 14 (Dec. 19). 
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been raised in the said communication, under the revised 1972 
Rules, there is no space for the Court to recognize that preliminary 
objections can be properly raised by extra-procedural 
communications. 88   In all these cases, the respondent states 
presented such communications in the provisional measures stage 
in which the Court may simply grant bifurcation. 
In these cases, the Court offered a post facto justification of its 
decision to consider the matter of jurisdiction on its own initiative, 
reasoning that it was supported by a statutory duty under Article 53 
of the Statute of the Court, which requires the Court to “satisfy 
itself” that it has jurisdiction if a party fails to appear.89  However, 
Article 53 was not referenced in the aforementioned orders.  Indeed, 
the Court’s reliance on Article 53 does not appear proper at this 
stage in the proceedings since the respondent’s non-appearance has 
yet to be ascertained until the time limit for submission of its first 
pleadings has passed.90  In any event, Article 53 does not have pre-
emptory effect on a procedural order issued at the stage of 
provisional measures even if it concerns jurisdiction.  This point is 
quite clear by reference of the Court’s handling of the respondent’s 
objections raised in extra-communication in the merits in the case of 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran.91 
Therefore, an outstanding objection presented at the provisional 
measures stage—not necessarily limited to non-appearing party’s 
extra-procedural communications—may facilitate the Court’s 
decision to bifurcate proceedings without waiting for further 
submission of a preliminary objection, as occurred in the Nicaragua 
case. 92   In such cases the Court exercised its inherent power to 
manage procedural issues to cope with circumstances not envisaged 
in the preliminary objection rule in force at the time.93  Or, if the 
 
 88 Rules of Court came into force on 1 September 1972, supra note 53. 
 89 Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Jurisdiction of the Court, 1973 I.C.J. Rep. 
7, para. 12 (Feb. 2); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment (Greece v. Turkey), 
Questions of Jurisdiction and/or Admissibility, 1978 I.C.J. Rep. 7, paras. 14-15 (Dec. 
19). 
 90 ROSENNE, supra note 13, at 851. 
 91 U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, supra note 83. 
 92 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Order, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 187 (May 10). 
 93 Nuclear Tests (Aust. v. Fr.), Questions of Jurisdiction and/or Admissibility, 
1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, ¶¶ 22-23 (Dec. 20).  This practice was later reflected in the 2001 
amendment to Article 79 of the Rules of Court. In paragraph 2 the Court states: 
“Notwithstanding paragraph 1 above, following the submission of the application 
and after the President has met and consulted with the parties, the Court may 
decide that any questions of jurisdiction and admissibility shall be determined 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss4/5
2019] Bifurcation in Inter-State Cases 957 
parties in the early stage of the proceedings, which in practice 
follows the submission of the application but precedes the first 
pleading, agree that the issues of jurisdiction and admissibility 
should be dealt with at a preliminary stage of the proceedings, the 
Court has in the past given effect to such agreements.94 
In these cases, prevalent since the 1970s, the Court has 
established a practice of evaluating jurisdiction issues separately 
from the main proceedings without the parties raising preliminary 
objections. 95   This practice of bifurcation was characterized by 
commentators as “isolation of jurisdiction.”96 
However, if the Court elects to wait to address jurisdictional 
issues, the respondent state is entitled to raise preliminary objections 
within the time limit prescribed under Article 79 of the Rules of 
Court. 97   Ultimately, a party has the privilege to secure a self-
contained proceeding on jurisdiction and admissibility unless it 
decides not to do so by failing to raise a timely objection or agrees 
that preliminary objections be heard and determined within the 
proceedings on the merits.98   From the 1972 Rules onwards, the 
 
separately.”  The new art. 79(2) was applied in the following two cases: Obligations 
concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to 
Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
Judgment, 2016 I.C.J. Rep. 255, and Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to 
Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Islands 
v. Pak.), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 2016 I.C.J. Rep. 552. 
 94 Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), Order, 1986 I.C.J. 
Rep. 552; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and 
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Order, 1991 I.C.J. Rep. 50; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. 
Can.), Order, 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 87; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Burundi), Order, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1019; Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Order, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 
1026. 
 95 See supra notes 84, 91-94. 
 96 ROSENNE, supra note 13, at 856-62.  In the case of “isolation of jurisdiction,” 
written pleadings are designated as “memorial” and “counter-memorial,” as 
opposed to the “Preliminary Objections” and the “Written Statement of 
Observations and Submissions.”  See Dietmar W. Prager, The 2001 Amendments to 
the Rules of Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1 L. & PRACTICE INT’L CTS. & 
TRIBUNALS 155, 168 (2002) (explaining that the new rule gives the Court the power 
to determine jurisdiction and admissibility before any proceedings on the merits). 
 97 See Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), Order, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 989; 
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), Order, 2000 I.C.J. Rep. 149 (fixing time 
limit for filing of the preliminary objections). 
 98 See Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), Order, 1956 I.C.J. Rep. 74 (May 
29) (stating that preliminary objections were formally raised, but the parties 
subsequently agreed to have these objections decided together with the merits. The 
Court joined the objections the merits).  A new provision that such an agreement 
“shall be given effect by the Court” was added to art. 67(8) of the Rules of Court 
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consequence of a preliminary objection submitted in due course is 
comprehensively described by Paragraph 3 (suspension of the main 
proceedings and a written proceeding addressing objections, now 
paragraph 5 of the 2001 Amendment), Paragraph 4 (a default oral 
hearing on preliminary objections, now Paragraph 6), and 
Paragraph 7 (disposal of preliminary objections in the form of 
judgement, now Paragraph 9). 99   This rule-based approach to 
bifurcation is clearly resolved in the modern Rules of Court.100 
3. THE MATTER OF BIFURCATION IN UNCLOS ANNEX VII 
ARBITRATION 
Since UNCLOS entered into force in 1994, 14 cases have been 
adjudicated under Annex VII Arbitration. 101   ICSID served as 
Registrar for the first case, the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, where the 
parties agreed that Japan’s preliminary objections to jurisdiction 
would be addressed in one round of submissions in writing, 
followed by a hearing, all in accordance with the agreed schedule.102  
This proceeding was disposed of by a separate award on jurisdiction 
and admissibility, in which the tribunal upheld an objection to 
jurisdiction and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the 
dispute.103 
 
(1972) and retained in the 1978 Revision and renumbered as art. 79 (10) (2001 
Amendment); Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. It.), 1987 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Order 
of Mar. 2); East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 91 (Order of June 30), para. 
4 (June 30); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2000 I.C.J. 
Rep. 182 (Order of Dec. 8), 236.  But cf. id. at 121 (explaining that this rule shall not 
be subject to unilateral modification). 
 99 Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 
 100  See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Som. v. Kenya), 
Judgment, 2017 I.C.J. Rep. 3, para. 5 (Feb. 2017) (explaining that proceedings on the 
merits had been suspended until resolving jurisdictional objections). 
 101 Southern Bluefin Tuna (Austl. v. Japan); MOX Plant case; Barb. v. Trin. & 
Tobago; Guy. v. Surin.; Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arb. (Bangl. v. India); 
Chagos Marine Protected Area Arb.; “Enrica Lexie” Incident; Atlanto-Scandian 
Herring Arb.; Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.); South China Sea Arb. (Phil. v. China); 
ARA Libertad Arb. (Arg. v. Ghana), Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the 
Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.); Duzgit Integrity Arb.; and 
Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor. 
 102  Southern Bluefin Tuna (Austl. v. Japan), Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility (2004) 23 Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 5, para. 7. 
 103 Id. at para. 72. 
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The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) served as Registrar 
in the remaining thirteen cases, publishing the tribunal’s Rules of 
Procedure on the PCA website in 11 of these cases.104  Provisions 
under the heading “Preliminary Objection” in these 11 published 
rules can be categorized into three types.  Seven of these cases 
provide the tribunals with discretion on the matter of bifurcation.105  
Two of them are identical articles adopted by the tribunals in the 
two non-appearance cases, which are, in principle, in favor of 
bifurcation. 106   The final two cases incorporate key elements of 
Article 79 of the ICJ’s Rules of Court (one is the pending Dispute 
Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch 
Strait).107  For the two cases in which Rules of Procedure were not 
published, proceedings were stayed while the parties reached a 
settlement and jointly requested the tribunal to deliver a final award 
binding upon the parties pursuant to their agreement.108  In Duzgit 
Integrity Arbitration, the respondent submitted its preliminary 
objections and made a request for bifurcation.109  The tribunal, after 
soliciting comments from the applicant and hearing the views of the 
parties, rejected this request.110  This mini-proceeding on bifurcation 
will be discussed throughout this Chapter. 
Now we look at these rules and the practice of the tribunals on 
the matter of bifurcation.  We consider each category of cases in turn, 
drawing on specific cases as examples. 
 
 104 MOX Plant case; Barb. v. Trin. & Tobago; Guy. v. Surin.; Bay of Bengal 
Maritime Boundary Arb. (Bangl. v. India), Chagos Marine Protected Area Arb., 
“Enrica Lexie” Incident, Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arb., Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. 
Russ); South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China); ARA Libertad Arb. (Arg. v. 
Ghana), Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and 
Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.).  The Rules of Procedure were not published in Duzgit 
Integrity Arb. and Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of 
Johor. 
 105 MOX Plant case; Barb. v. Trin. & Tobago; Guy. v. Surin., Bay of Bengal 
Maritime Boundary Arb. (Bangl. v. India); Chagos Marine Protected Area Arb.; 
“Enrica Lexie” Incident; Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arb. 
 106 The Arctic Sunrise case (Neth. v. Russ.); South China Sea Arb. (Phil. v. 
China). 
 107  ARA Libertad Arb. (Arg. v. Ghana); Dispute Concerning Coastal State 
Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.). 
 108 See Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor 
(Malay. v. Sing.), 45 I.L.M. (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005) (deciding that in light of the joint 
request by the Parties that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to render the Award). 
 109  Duzgit Integrity Arb. (Malta v. São Tomé & Príncipe), (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2016). 
 110 Id. 
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3.1. Discretionary bifurcation in the Rules of Procedure and no 
bifurcation in practice 
The MOX Plant case was the first case initiated under Annex VII 
Arbitration that PCA served as Registrar.  Article 11(3) of the Rules 
of Procedure provides: “The tribunal may rule on objections  . . .  as 
a preliminary question or it may proceed with the arbitration and 
rule on such an objection in its final award (emphasis added).”111  
The tribunals in the following five cases adopted the articles on 
preliminary objection corresponding mutatis mutandis to Article 
11(3) of the MOX Plant Rules of Procedure: Barbados v. Trinidad and 
Tobago, 112  Guyana v. Suriname, 113  Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary 
Arbitration between Bangladesh and India,114 Chagos Marine Protected 
Area Arbitration,115 and “Enrica Lexie” Incident.116  Significantly, the 
PAC’s Model Rules of Procedure also provide the same discretion 
to an arbitral tribunal on the matter of bifurcation.117 
 
 111 MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Rules of Procedure, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2001), art. 
11(3). 
 112 Barb. v. Trin. & Tobago, Rules of Procedure, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004), art. 
10(3). 
 113 Guy. v. Surin., Rules of Procedure, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004), art. 10(3). 
 114  Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arb. (Bangl. v. India), Rules of 
Procedure, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009) art. 10(3). 
 115  Chagos Marine Protected Area Arb. (Mauritius v. U.K.), Rules of 
Procedures, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012), art. 11(3). 
 116 ”Enrica Lexie” Incident, (It. v. India), Rules of Procedure, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2016), art. 10(4) (Jan. 2016). 
 117 Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States, (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 2012), art. 21(4), https://pca-cpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/Optional-Rules-for-Arbitrating-Disputes-
between-Two-States_1992.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8X4-FFXK]; Arbitration Rules 
(effective Dec. 17, 2012), (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012), art. 23(3), https://pca-cpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/175/2015/11/PCA-Arbitration-Rules-2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5P7M-Q59G].  Since the P.C.A. is more frequently used for 
international commercial arbitrations, we may assume that the P.C.A.’s model 
Arbitration Rules reflect the practice of international commercial arbitrations.  In 
this regard, we find the same provision also in Article 23(3) in the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rule, see UNCITRAL Arbitration Rule (as revised in 2010), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-
rules-revised-2010-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4MU-SNUZ].  In international 
commercial arbitrations, tribunals have the power to decide on the matter of 
bifurcation according to their rules of arbitration, or they shall have discretion on 
this matter in exercising their inherent judicial function in the absence of any 
explicit provision.  See generally Vojtěch Trapl, Thinking Big—Bifurcation of 
Arbitration Proceedings—To Bifurcate or Not To Bifurcate, 4 CZECH YEARBOOK PUB. & 
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The Rules of Procedure of Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arbitration do 
not explicitly provide that the tribunal may either rule on objections 
as a preliminary issue or in its final award.118  However, Article 12, 
under the heading “Preliminary Objections and Stay of 
Proceedings,” provides in Paragraph 3: 
Upon receipt of a preliminary objection under paragraph 
2(a) the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide by a reasoned 
Procedural Order, promptly after having heard the Parties 
orally by way of a meeting, whether to order bifurcation or 
to decline to order bifurcation and to reserve the preliminary 
objections for the final Award.119 
With this mini proceeding on the question of bifurcation (rather 
than on questions of jurisdiction or admissibility), the tribunal 
maintains discretionary power on the question of bifurcation.  This 
matter will be dealt with subsequently. 
In the abovementioned seven cases, the tribunals only had a 
chance to consider the issue of bifurcation in the Guyana v. Suriname 
case and Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration.  In the other five 
cases, preliminary objections were either not raised (two cases),120 or 
the issue of bifurcation did not come out as an issue for other reasons 
(three cases).121 
 
PRIVATE INT’L L. 267 (2013); Massimo V. Benedettelli, To Bifurcate or Not To Bifurcate? 
That is the (Ambiguous) Question, 29 ARB. INT’L 493 (2013). 
 118 Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arb. (Den. v. EU), Rules of Procedure, PCA Case 
Repository, art. 12(3) (Mar. 2014). 
 119 Id. 
 120 See Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arb. (Bangl. v. India), PCA Case 
Repository (2014) (noting that India did not raise preliminary objections in its 
counter memorial); “Enrica Lexie” Incident (It. v. India), Case No. 2015-28, 
Procedural Order No. 3 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2017), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2145 [https://perma.cc/VJ4N-FVXP] 
(noting that India did not submit preliminary objections within the time limit). 
 121 See MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Procedural Order No. 3, para. 29 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 2003), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/867 
[https://perma.cc/N9T5-XK3U] (holding that it was unnecessary to decide 
whether to bifurcate the case at that time because the arbitration was being 
conducted under Article 8 of the Rules but not Article 11 on Preliminary Objection; 
MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Procedural Order No. 6 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/870 [https://perma.cc/V583-M763] 
(announcing that Ireland has withdrawn the case and the case was terminated); 
Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arb. (Den. v. Eur.), Case No. 2013-30, Procedural Order 
No. 2 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/784 
[https://perma.cc/9U6Z-WLZV] (staying the proceedings at the early stage under 
the agreement of the parties); Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arb. (Den. v. Eur.), Case 
No. 2013-30, Termination Order (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014), 
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In Guyana v. Suriname, upon receiving the preliminary objection 
submitted by Suriname, the tribunal invited the parties to submit 
their views in writing and then arranged a two-day meeting to hear 
arguments on the issue of bifurcation.122  This informal proceeding 
on the matter of bifurcation was not specified in Article 10 of the 
tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, but was rather initiated by the 
tribunal probably within the meaning of Article 10(3), directing the 
tribunal to ascertain the views of the parties before deciding whether 
to rule on objections to jurisdiction or admissibility issues as a 
preliminary determination or in its final award.123  Therefore, the 
submissions in writing and a hearing in this mini-proceeding dealt 
with the question of whether the objections were “said to be 
preliminary (or exclusively preliminary) in character”; the tribunal, 
on the basis that “the objections are not of an exclusively preliminary 
character,” decided in its No. 2 Order, in accordance with Article 
10(3) of its Rules of Procedure, to rule on Suriname’s preliminary 
objections to jurisdiction and admissibility in its final award.124 
In Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, Article 11 
(Preliminary Objection) of the tribunal’s Rules of Procedure 
explicitly provided one round of submission in writing on the 
question of bifurcation, and a one-day hearing on the matter.125  
Under this mini-proceeding, the written submissions and the 
hearing are confined to the question of bifurcation and do not 
directly address jurisdiction or admissibility.126  In its No. 2 Order, 
the tribunal rejected the United Kingdom’s request for bifurcation 
 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/781 [https://perma.cc/GBK7-5KWY] 
(terminating the stay by agreement of the parties);  Barb. v. Trin. & Tobago, Case 
No. 2004-02, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1116 [https://perma.cc/74VA-VG7E] 
(noting that the respondent State asked the tribunal to join its preliminary 
objections to the merits to be determined in the tribunal’s final award). 
 122 See Guy. v. Surin., Case No. 2004-04, Award, paras. 40-48 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2007), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/902 [https://perma.cc/D72Y-
4YPQ]. 
 123 See id. 
 124 See Guy. v. Surin., Case No. 2004-04, Order No. 2 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/884 [https://perma.cc/C68K-8DMN]. 
 125 See Chagos Marine Protected Area Arb. (Mauritius v. U.K.), supra note 115, 
Rules of Procedures, art. 11(4)-(5) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011). 
 126 See id. 
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and decided that the preliminary objections would be considered 
with the proceedings on the merits.127 
This mini-proceeding on the question of bifurcation was also 
implemented by the tribunal in Duzgit Integrity Arbitration, who, in 
its No. 2 Order, rejected the respondent’s request for bifurcation (the 
PCA did not publish the tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, or its No. 2 
Order).128 
In contrast to Guyana v. Suriname, the tribunal of Chagos Marine 
Protected Area Arbitration and the tribunal of Duzgit Integrity 
Arbitration rejected the respondents’ request for bifurcation without 
giving any reason as to whether or not the objection possessed an 
exclusively preliminary character.129  Rather, it indicated that the 
preliminary character of an objection was at most a factor for 
consideration within the tribunal’s discretion in the implementation 
of the mini-proceedings on bifurcation.  In Guyana v. Suriname, if the 
tribunal found that the objection possessed an exclusively 
preliminary character, it remains to be seen whether the tribunal, 
while still retaining the discretion explicitly provided by its Rules of 
Procedure, would bifurcate the proceedings without taking into 
consideration other circumstances, e.g., efficiency of the ad hoc 
arbitration (see the discussion in Chapter 4). 
In each of the cases, when a respondent raised its preliminary 
objection, a mini-proceeding on the matter of bifurcation was 
followed without suspension of the main proceedings.130 
The mini proceeding was within the tribunal’s discretion on 
bifurcation, even when the mini proceeding was not specified in the 
Rules of Procedure.  The format of the mini proceedings varied 
across the three cases; some permitted only oral arguments, while 
others required submissions in writing in addition to a hearing.  
When narrowly examining the question of bifurcation, however, the 
tribunals consider a variety of factors in exercising their discretion.  
 
 127 See Chagos Marine Protected Area Arb. (Mauritius v. U.K.), Case No. 2011-
03, Procedural Order No. 2 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1795 [https://perma.cc/6L95-R94P]. 
 128 See Duzgit Integrity Arb., supra note 109. 
 129 See Chagos Marine Protected Area Arb., supra note 127; Duzgit Integrity 
Arb., supra note 109. 
 130 See Guy. v. Surin., supra note 113 (providing a clear example of the tribunal 
deciding to undertake a mini-proceeding on bifurcation without suspending its 
main proceeding).  In fact, resolution of the question of bifurcation in the three cases 
was reached within approximately two months from the submission of preliminary 
objections; the original timetable for the submission of pleadings and the 
scheduling of hearings were barely affected. 
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The question of whether an objection possesses an exclusively 
preliminary character was not indispensable to the bifurcation 
inquiry, though sometimes it dominated the reasoning for non-
bifurcation.  In the mini proceedings, deliberation on bifurcation did 
not permit an argument on jurisdiction and admissibility to be fully 
debated; therefore, the tribunals at this stage could not adjudicate 
questions of jurisdiction or admissibility that had been raised as 
preliminary objections.  Unlike the ICJ, the tribunals cannot render 
a separate judgment (award) to dispose of preliminary objections, 
including a judgment (award) declaring that the preliminary 
objection does not possess an exclusively preliminary character. 
At the conclusion of the mini proceedings in the three above-
mentioned cases, the tribunals made decisions on the question of 
bifurcation in the form of procedural orders – but all ended with 
rejections to the requests for bifurcation. The mini proceeding 
concluding with a procedural order necessarily constitutes a kind of 
procedural response to a duly raised preliminary objection.  
However, it is a procedure for deliberation on bifurcation only, so 
the tribunal cannot adjudicate the preliminary objection.  In contrast, 
under Article 79 of the ICJ’s Rules of Court, a party that duly submits 
its preliminary objections will have the Court adjudicate on 
questions raised therein, with no proceedings on the matter of 
bifurcation.131  This is the fundamental procedural difference when 
responding to a duly submitted preliminary objection. 
3.2. The matter of bifurcation in two cases of non-appearance 
In South China Sea Arbitration and Arctic Sunrise, the tribunals, 
having been constituted without participation of the respondents,132 
adopted Rules of Procedure to address potential non-appearance.133  
Both sets of Rules adopted an identical Article 20 containing four 
 
 131 See Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs, art. 79. 
 132 See UNCLOS, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. at Annex VII 
art. 3(c), (e) (discussing the appointment of members to an arbitral tribunal). 
 133 The respective Rules of Procedure for these two cases of non-appearance 
set forth identical Article 25 provisions on “Failure to Appear or to Make 
Submissions.”  See The Arctic Sunrise Arb. (Neth. v. Russ.), Rules of Procedure, 
PCA Case Repository, art. 25 (Mar. 17, 2014), 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1317 [https://perma.cc/SZK5-
AW9C]; South China Sea Arb. (Phil. v. China), Rules of Procedure, PCA Case 
Repository (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/233 
[https://perma.cc/3GSC-53U9]. 
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paragraphs regarding “Preliminary Objections.”134  The deadline for 
raising a plea concerning jurisdiction is “no later than in the 
Counter-Memorial.” 135  A later plea may be admitted by the 
tribunals,136 though it is not clear whether raising an objection to 
jurisdiction in an extra-procedural communication would constitute 
such a plea.137  The ensuing paragraphs of Article 20 read as follows: 
The Arbitral Tribunal shall rule on any plea concerning its 
jurisdiction as a preliminary question, unless the Arbitral 
Tribunal determines, after seeking the views of the Parties, 
that the objection to its jurisdiction does not possess an 
exclusively preliminary character, in which case it shall rule 
on such a plea in conjunction with the merits. 
Prior to a ruling on any matters relating to jurisdiction or 
admissibility, a hearing shall be held if the Arbitral Tribunal 
determines that such a hearing is necessary or useful, after 
seeking the views of the Parties.138 
In Arctic Sunrise, within three weeks of the initiation of the 
arbitration, Russia objected to jurisdiction in an extra-procedural 
communication and provided justification of non-appearance, on 
the basis of Article 298 of the UNCLOS. 139   The Netherlands 
requested provisional measures from ITLOS since the arbitral 
tribunal was yet-to-be constituted.140  Russia’s communication was 
 
 134 See The Arctic Sunrise Arb. (Neth. v. Russ.), Rules of Procedure, PCA Case 
Repository, art. 20 (Mar. 17, 2014); South China Sea Arb. (Phil. v. China), Rules of 
Procedure, PCA Case Repository, art. 20 (Aug. 27, 2013). 
 135 See id. art. 20(2). 
 136 See id. (“A plea that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall 
be raised no later than in the Counter-Memorial  . . .  The Arbitral Tribunal may, in 
either case, admit a later plea if it considers the delay justified”). 
 137  Note that in ICJ cases, objections raised in extra-procedural 
communications can no longer be taken as formal “pleading” under the article on 
preliminary objections since Fisheries Jurisdiction.  See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. 
Ice.), supra note 87, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), supra note 87 and 
accompanying text (highlighting the Court’s continued manifestation of this 
approach). 
 138 See The Arctic Sunrise Arb. Rules of Proc., supra note 133, art. 20(3)-(4); The 
South China Sea Arb. Rules of Proc., supra note 133, art. 20(3)-(4). 
 139 See The Arctic Sunrise Arb. (Neth. v. Russ.), Award on the Merits, PCA 
Case Repository, para. 5 (Aug. 14, 2015), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1438 [https://perma.cc/HX9E-8HUK]. 
 140 See UNCLOS, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. at art. 290(5) 
(articulating the circumstances required for such a request to be entertained by 
ITLOS). 
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evaluated by ITLOS when ITLOS considered prescribing 
provisional measures.141  ITLOS, however, could not prescribe any 
procedural arrangement on the matter of bifurcation because 
procedural prescriptions regarding bifurcation are only within the 
purview of the arbitral tribunal. After the constitution of the arbitral 
tribunal, the applicant, Netherlands, requested bifurcation in its 
Memorial. 142   The Netherlands saw this as the appropriate 
procedural response to Russia’s extra-procedural communication, 
and the tribunal offered Russia the opportunity to comment on 
applicants’ request.143  In its No. 4 Procedural Order, the tribunal 
determined that Russia’s extra-procedural communication 
effectively constituted “a plea concerning this Arbitral Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction to which Article 20(3) of the Rules of Procedure applies, 
and such a plea possesses an exclusively preliminary character.”144  
The tribunal then decided to “rule on this plea concerning its 
jurisdiction as a preliminary question without holding a hearing.”145 
In South China Sea Arbitration, from the time the arbitration was 
initiated, China persistently held that it did not accept the 
arbitration.146  Nevertheless, the tribunal set a deadline for China’s 
submission of its Counter-Memorial. 147   A week before China’s 
submission was due, China published a Position Paper of the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of 
Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the 
Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter “China’s Position Paper”), 
in which China argued three major objections to the tribunal’s 
 
 141 See The “Arctic Sunrise” Case, (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No. 22, Order of Nov. 
22, 2013, ITLOS Rep. 240, para. 42. 
 142 See The Arctic Sunrise Arb. (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No. 2014-02, Proc. Order 
No. 4 (Bifurcation), § 1 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014), 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1324 [https://perma.cc/BV37-
P327]. 
 143 See id. at 3. 
 144 See id. at 3. 
 145 See id. 
 146  See Letter from The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the 
Republic of the Philippines to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
the Philippines (Feb. 19, 2013), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2165478/phl-prc-china-note-
verbale.pdf [https://perma.cc/GX5C-LX3X] [hereinafter Letter from PRC to 
Philippines 2013] (“China therefore rejects and returns the Philippines’ Note Verbal 
No 13-0211 and the attached Notification.”). 
 147 See The South China Sea Arb. (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Proc. Order 
No.2, at 3, https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1805 
[https://perma.cc/9BAC-RXTJ]. 
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jurisdiction. 148   In the Position Paper, however, no request for 
bifurcation was explicitly made. 149   The tribunal invited the 
Philippines to comment on, among other things, a possible 
bifurcation of the proceedings.150   The Philippines replied to the 
tribunal that bifurcation would be “neither appropriate or 
desirable,” since “the jurisdictional issues . . . are plainly interwoven 
with the merits.”151  In the operative part of its No. 4 Procedural 
Order, the tribunal considered China’s extra-procedural 
communications to effectively constitute a plea concerning the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 20 of the Rules of 
Procedure and decided to bifurcate the proceedings.152  The tribunal 
reserved the issue of whether jurisdictional objections possess 
exclusively preliminary character, to be determined later in the 
hearing on jurisdiction.153 
Under these tribunals’ identical Article 20(3) of Rules of 
Procedure, tribunals “shall rule on any plea concerning its 
jurisdiction as a preliminary question, unless the Arbitral Tribunal 
determines . . . that the objection to its jurisdiction does not possess 
an exclusively preliminary character, in which case it shall rule on 
such a plea in conjunction with the merits.” 154   The procedural 
response to a plea, in principle, is bifurcation, which does not 
necessarily require any decision.  The only explicit exception to this 
principle applies if the tribunal determines that the objection to its 
 
 148  See MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
POSITION PAPER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE 
MATTER OF JURISDICTION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION INITIATED BY THE 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (2014) at ¶ 86, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm 
[https://perma.cc/CZG5-C447] [hereinafter “China’s Position Paper”] 
(articulating the reasoning for concluding that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have 
jurisdiction over this case). 
 149 See id. ¶ 3. 
 150 See The South China Sea Arb. (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Proc. Order 
No.4, at ¶ 4 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1807%3E%203 
[https://perma.cc/XJJ2-SYS5]. 
 151 See id. 
 152  See id. §§ 1.1-1.3 (discussing the circumstances and the Tribunal’s 
determination regarding bifurcation). 
 153  See id. § 2.2 (identifying the Tribunal’s determination regarding its 
approach to considerations of jurisdictional objections that do not possess an 
exclusively preliminary character). 
 154 See The Arctic Sunrise Arb. Rules of Proc., supra note 133, art. 20(3), The 
South China Sea Arb. Rules of Proc., supra note 133, art. 20(3). 
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jurisdiction does not possess an exclusively preliminary character.155  
According to Article 20(3), the tribunal may decide on the matter of 
bifurcation in the form of procedural order, in which it shall 
exclusively address the question of exception and nothing else 
(other circumstantial factors such as efficiency etc.). 156   For this 
purpose, the decision  must, therefore, be “prior to a ruling on any 
matters relating to jurisdiction or admissibility,” though a hearing 
shall be held if the tribunal finds it necessary or useful.157  A mini 
proceeding on bifurcation becomes possible, but remains confined 
to the question of exception. A mini proceeding can be regarded as 
a procedural response to the objection raised in a party’s extra-
procedural communication if the tribunal considers it as a plea. 
However, the tribunal at this stage cannot adjudicate jurisdictional 
questions raised by such a plea. 
In Arctic Sunrise, the applicant, the Netherlands, in its request for 
bifurcation, did not raise the question of exception, but the tribunal 
stated in its order for bifurcation that there was no exception.158  In 
South China Sea Arbitration, China did not explicitly request 
bifurcation in its extra-procedural communication in which it did 
timely raised objection concerning the tribunal’s jurisdiction.159  The 
tribunal neglected the question of exception in its order for 
bifurcation and reserved the matter to be considered and decided in 
the proceedings on preliminary objections.160  The tribunal stated in 
its Award on Jurisdiction that some of China’s objections did not 
possess an exclusively preliminary character.161  Since this question 
is reserved to the preliminary phase where parties are supposed to 
contest jurisdiction exclusively,  the tribunal interpreted and applied 
Article 20 of the Rules of Procedures in a way similar to Article 79 of 
 
 155 See id. 
 156 See id. 
 157 See id. art. 20(4). 
 158 See Arctic Sunrise Arb. Proc. Order No. 4, supra note 142, ¶ 2 (discussing 
the Court’s explanation in light of Netherlands’ approach). 
 159 See supra note 149. 
 160  See South China Sea Arb. Proc. Order No. 4, supra note 150, ¶ 2.2 
(explaining the outcome of the tribunal’s deliberations on the question). 
 161 See The South China Sea Arb. (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 398, 399, 402, 405, 406, 409, 411 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2015), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506 
[https://perma.cc/5588-YPAX] (concluding that possible jurisdictional objections 
with respect to the dispute underlying some of the Philippines’ Submission do not 
possess an exclusively preliminary character, reserves decisions on its jurisdiction 
with respect to the Philippines’ Submissions in conjunction with the merits). 
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the ICJ Rules of Court.  However, as the decision on bifurcation 
manifested by a procedural order depends only on the question of 
exception under Article 20(3), deferring this question to the 
preliminary proceeding raises questions about why bifurcation was 
ordered and whether this mini-proceeding and order on bifurcation 
was necessary. 
For both cases of non-appearance, the tribunals’ bifurcation 
orders were issued after the expiration of the deadline for 
respondent’s submission,162  or after respondent’s decision to not 
submit a counter-memorial. 163   With their bifurcation orders, 
respondents’ non-appearance becomes a fact to the tribunals.  Only 
in the South China Sea Arbitration did the bifurcation order reference 
Annex VII Article 9 (addressing non-appearance) in its preamble in 
addition to referencing other matters as circumstantial factors; the 
order also explicitly referred to the ICJ practice of bifurcating 
proceedings in cases of non-appearance to justify the tribunal’s 
decision.164  The tribunal of the South China Sea Arbitration might 
have used China’s non-appearance to justify the necessity of the 
bifurcation order, had the tribunal not also held the objections raised 
in China’s extra-procedural communication to effectively constitute 
a plea concerning the tribunal’s jurisdiction to which Article 20(3) of 
the Rules of Procedure shall apply. 
However, the actions of the arbitral tribunals are no perfectly 
akin to the ICJ’s approach to cases involving non-appearance.  In 
cases of non-appearance, while the Court did issue procedural 
orders on bifurcation without waiting for formal preliminary 
objections required by Article 79 of the Rules of Court, the Court 
never took non-appearance as justification when issuing orders of 
bifurcation, nor did it regard non-appearance as having pre-
emptory effect on bifurcation.165  In other words, if the objection 
 
 162 See South China Sea Arb. Proc. Order No. 4, supra note 150, ¶ 2 (noting Proc 
Order No. 4 (bifurcation) was made in about four months after the time-limit set for 
China to submit counter memorial). 
 163 See Arctic Sunrise Arb. Proc. Order No. 4, supra note 142, ¶ 2 (outlining the 
timeline of events leading to the outcome in the Order). 
 164 See South China Sea Arb. Proc. Order No. 4, supra note 150, ¶ 3 (discussing 
the circumstances that led the tribunal to its determination). 
 165 See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Jurisdiction of the Court, supra note 
87, ¶ 12; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.) Judgment on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility, supra note 87, ¶¶ 14-15; U.S. Diplomatic Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. 
Iran), Judgement, supra note 83 and accompanying text (portraying the impact of 
different facts and outcomes across cases).  See also ROSENNE, supra note 13, at 808 
(lending insight into the approach of the ICJ to questions of non-appearance). 
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raised in extra-procedural communications is no longer regarded as 
constituting the formal preliminary objection, the non-appearing 
state cannot obtain a right to bifurcation within the meaning of 
Article 79.  The tribunal’s application of Article 20 of the Rules of 
Procedures, however, together with its unique approach to non-
appearance in South China Sea Arbitration, imply an 
acknowledgement of a procedural right of the non-appearing party 
who had timely raised its objection concerning jurisdiction.  
Ultimately, both tribunals relied on an identical Article 20 of the 
Rules of Procedure to bifurcate the proceedings, arguably for the 
purpose of promoting procedural legitimacy in cases of non-
appearance. 
3.3. Incorporation of Elements of Article 79 of the ICJ Rules of Court 
In the other two cases, the tribunals’ Rules of Procedure 
incorporate major elements of Article 79 of the ICJ Rules of Court, 
which enable rule-based bifurcation.  In the ARA Libertad Arbitration 
(Argentina v. Ghana), Article 13 of the tribunal’s Rules of Procedure 
provides: 
3. Upon receipt of a Preliminary Objection under paragraph 
2(a), the proceedings on the merits shall be suspended. 
Argentina shall be entitled to file a written statement of its 
observations and submissions no later than three months 
from the filing by Ghana of its submissions on the 
Preliminary Objection. 
4. Any Preliminary Objection by Ghana shall be dealt with 
by way of an oral hearing. After hearing the Parties, the 
Arbitral Tribunal shall rule on Ghana’s Preliminary 
Objection either as a preliminary issue or in its final Award.  
If the Tribunal rejects the preliminary objection or decides to 
give the ruling in its final Award, Ghana shall submit its 
Counter-Memorial no later than six months after that 
decision. The Tribunal shall fix the time limits for further 
proceedings.166 
 
 166 See The ARA Libertad Arb. (Argentina v. Ghana), PCA Case Repository, 
Rules of Procedure, art. 13 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/427 [https://perma.cc/58TV-K6GB]. 
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By raising preliminary objections, Ghana obtains a separate 
proceeding containing one round of written submissions an oral 
debate on preliminary objections.167  The proceedings on the merits 
shall also be suspended accordingly. 168   At the closure of this 
separate proceeding (on Preliminary Objection in toto but not on the 
matter of bifurcation), there will be a ruling on Ghana’s Preliminary 
Objection either upholding or rejecting the preliminary objections, 
or a decision to give the ruling in its final award.169  This provision, 
however, is silent as to whether such a ruling or decision shall be 
made in the form of a judgment (award).  This is very similar to the 
rule-based bifurcation that Article 79 of the ICJ Rules of Court 
contemplates.170 
In this case, Ghana appeared to be a reluctant respondent as it 
“never did get around to appointing an arbitrator.”171  Pending the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal, Argentina petitioned ITLOS for 
a provisional measure pursuant to Article 290(5) of UNCLOS.172  
Ghana submitted a written statement in which it stated that the 
“Annex VII arbitral tribunal which is to be constituted will not have 
jurisdiction over the dispute submitted to it by Argentina.” 173  
 
 167 See id. 
 168 See id. 
 169 See id. 
 170 See Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs, art. 79 (outlining the procedural rules 
of the ICJ). 
 171  See Susan Simpson, Argentina’s Sham Annex VII Arbitration and ITLOS’ 
Provisional Ruling on the Merits of the ARA Libertad Case, THE VIEW FROM LL2 
(Feb. 9, 2013), https://viewfromll2.com/2013/02/09/argentinas-sham-annex-vii-
arbitration-and-itlos-provisional-ruling-on-the-merits-of-the-ara-libertad-case 
[https://perma.cc/PE96-LFMA] (discussing an observation based on the available 
records to Ms. Simpson.  She noted that paragraph 70 of Argentine’s Request for 
Provisional Measures, Argentina states: “[t]o date, Ghana has not appointed a 
member of the arbitral tribunal and has not reacted to the invitation of Argentina 
to enter into discussions with it for the purpose of appointing the other members of 
the Annex VII arbitral tribunal.”  But the page with paragraph 70 is missing in the 
ITLOS website publicizing this request); see also, ITLOS “Frigate Ara Libertad” 
(Argentina v. Ghana), Written Statement by Argentina, Request for the Prescription of 
Provisions Measures Under Article 290, Paragraph 5, of the Unites Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, (Nov. 14, 2012), 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20-
Request_for_official_website.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G7Q-Z8D7]. 
 172 See “ARA Libertad” (Argentina v. Ghana), Provisional Measures, Order of 
15 December 2012, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 332. 
 173 See ITLOS “Frigate Ara Libertad” (Argentina v. Ghana), Written Statement 
by Ghana, Request for the Prescription of Provisions Measures Under Article 290, 
Paragraph 5, of the Unites Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (Nov. 28, 2012), ¶ 
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Difficulties also arose in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.  
When parties were unable to agree on the remaining three 
arbitrators, the president of ITLOS made the appointment at the 
request of Argentina. 174   This might suggest that by reaching 
agreement with Argentina on Article 13—under which it acquired a 
right to bifurcation—a reluctant Ghana was able to contest 
jurisdiction exclusively; however, due to the limited disclosure of 
proceedings one can only infer this possibility.  The case was 
ultimately terminated by agreement of the parties before the 
deadline for Ghana to submit preliminary objections.175 
In Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of 
Azov, and Kerch Strait, Article 10 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure 
(Objections to the Jurisdiction and/or Admissibility) provides: 
4. The Arbitral Tribunal shall rule on any Preliminary 
Objection in a preliminary phase of the proceedings, unless 
the Arbitral Tribunal determines, after ascertaining the 
views of the Parties, that such Objection does not possess an 
exclusively preliminary character and should be ruled upon 
in conjunction with the merits. 
5. In the event that some or all of the Preliminary Objection(s) 
are addressed in a preliminary phase, the proceedings on the 
merits shall be suspended  . . . . 
6. Unless the Arbitral Tribunal decides otherwise after 
ascertaining the views of the Parties, the further proceedings 
shall be oral. 
7. The written observations and submissions referred to in 
paragraph 5, and the statements and evidence presented at 
the hearings contemplated by paragraph 6, shall be confined 
 
2, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20-
Request_for_official_website.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G7Q-Z8D7]. 
 174 See Press Release, Int’l Tribunal for The Law of the Sea, Three Arbitrators 
Appointed in the Arbitral Proceedings Instituted by the Argentine Republic against 
the Republic of Ghana in respect of a Dispute concerning the Vessel Ara Libertad, 
ITLOS/Press 189, (Feb. 5, 2013), 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/PR_1
89_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PBH-B7P2] (declaring three arbitrators appointed to 
the arbitral proceedings between Argentina and Ghana). 
 175 See The Ara Libertad Arb. (Argentina v. Ghana), PCA 2013-11, Termination 
Order, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013), ¶ 4-5, https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/429 
[https://perma.cc/SCR7-TAJM] (declaring the termination of the international 
arbitration because of the finding that Ghanaian courts of the rules applicable to the 
case). 
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to those matters which are relevant to the Preliminary 
Objection  . . . 
8. The Arbitral Tribunal shall give its decision in the form of 
an award, by which it shall uphold the objection or reject it 
or declare that the objection does not possess, in the 
circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary 
character.  If the Arbitral Tribunal rejects the objection or 
declares that it does not possess an exclusively preliminary 
character, it shall fix time-limits for the further 
proceedings.176 
Article 10(4) of the Rules of Procedure in the instant case is very 
similar to the mode of bifurcation that the identical Article 20(3) of 
Rules of Procedure contemplates in the two non-appearance 
cases.177   This provision envisages a proceeding and decision on 
bifurcation in the form of a procedural order akin to the tribunals’ 
practice in the two cases of non-appearance.  Unlike the two non-
appearance cases, hearings extend to matters relevant to 
Preliminary Objection, 178  but are not necessarily confined to the 
question of exception.  More fundamentally, “the Arbitral Tribunal 
shall give its decision in the form of an award,” including a declaration 
that the objection does not possess an exclusively preliminary 
character.179  Since this award is stipulated in the rule on jurisdiction 
and/or admissibility, no doubt, it is a jurisdictional award.  If this 
award does not result in disposal of the case (by upholding the 
objection), the tribunal “shall fix time-limits for the further 
proceedings.”  The pre-determined prescription of a jurisdictional 
award implies that, notwithstanding the stipulated suspension in 
Article 10(5), the proceedings on the merits shall be suspended upon 
the submission of Preliminary Objection, until the time designated 
by such an award. 
On May 21, 2018, Russia timely submitted its Preliminary 
Objection in accordance with Article 10(2), noting that “all the 
 
 176 See Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, 
and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.), PCA 2017-06, Rules of Procedure, art. 10 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 2017), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2136 
[https://perma.cc/6HUB-3RCN]. 
 177 See id. Rules of Procedure, art. 10(4) (stating bifurcation is the principle 
unless there is an exception that objection does not possess an exclusively 
preliminary character). 
 178 See id. art. 10(6), 10(7). 
 179 Id. art. 10(8) (emphasis added). 
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objections fall to be determined in a preliminary phase of the 
proceedings in accordance with the general principle established by 
Article 10(4) of the Rules of Procedure.”180  Ukraine was invited to 
comment on Russia’s request for bifurcation, and Ukraine argued 
that Russia’s objections were “deeply intertwined with the merits of 
this case and lack an exclusively preliminary character.” 181  
Accordingly, Ukraine requested that the tribunal declined Russia’s 
request for bifurcation.182  Russia was invited to reply, and Russia 
refuted Ukraine’s Comment. 183   In its Procedural Order No. 3 
(“Regarding Bifurcation of the Proceeding”) on August 20, 2018, the 
tribunal concluded that Russia’s Preliminary Objections appear at 
this stage to be of a character that required them to be examined in a 
preliminary phase and decided that the objections shall be 
addressed in a preliminary phase of these proceedings.184  It follows 
that, “if the tribunal determines after the closure of the preliminary 
phase of the proceedings that there are Preliminary Objections that 
do not possess an exclusive preliminary character,” such matters 
shall be reserved to the proceedings on the merits, in accordance 
with Article 10(8) of the Rules of Procedure.185 
The tribunal’s bifurcation order was made nearly two years after 
Ukraine initiated this arbitration.186  The proceeding on the matter 
of bifurcation lasted three months.  Whether this constitutes 
unwarranted delay and cost, this is a matter of the parties’ 
appreciation.  The tribunal devoted significant time to settling the 
differences between the parties and to interpreting and applying 
Article 10(4) of the Rules of Procedure.  Article 10(4) requires the 
tribunal to consider the question of exception and to decide whether 
to bifurcate the proceeding.187  The tribunal justified the procedural 
order for bifurcation on Article 10(4) with an interim appreciation of 
 
 180 See Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, 
and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.), PCA 2017-06, Procedural Order No.3, Regarding 
Bifurcation of the Proceedings, 3 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2017), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2446 [https://perma.cc/K6VW-U25W]. 
 181 See id. at 3. 
 182 See id. 
 183 See id. at 4. 
 184 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 185 Id. (discussing the tribunal’s response should it find preliminary objections 
that are not exclusively preliminary in nature). 
 186 The arbitration was initiated by Ukraine On September 16, 2016 and the 
bifurcation order was delivered by the tribunal on August 20, 2018. 
 187 See supra note 176. 
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Russia’s objections.188   This is an improvement on the reasoning 
behind the bifurcation decision by the South China Sea Arbitration 
tribunal in the application of Article 20(3) of its Rules of 
Procedure.189 
Having said that, I find that it is not possible for the tribunal to 
make a procedural order for non-bifurcation on the basis of an 
interim conclusion that the objection does not possess an exclusively 
preliminary character, because a conclusion as such must be made, 
under Article 10(8), in the form of award and it cannot be interim.190  
Article 10(8) restricts the tribunal when it issues a procedural order 
on bifurcation: it must either state an interim appreciation of the 
objection and leaves it to be further tested in the preliminary phase, 
or determine that the objection possesses an exclusively preliminary 
character and rule that they constitute preliminary questions.  None 
of them enable the tribunal to issue a procedural order for non-
bifurcation. As such, the mini-proceeding and order on bifurcation 
envisaged in Article 10(4) seem superfluous. Ultimately, bifurcation 
is determined by Article 10(8). By this same award, the tribunal shall 
conclude a proceeding initiated by Russia’s objection, irrespective of 
whether this proceeding is termed “a preliminary phase” (in the 
words of Article 10(5)) or not.  The proceeding and this award do 
not necessarily involve any decision on the matter of bifurcation.  
Here, Russia is entitled to a procedural response to its preliminary 
objection in the form of an [jurisdictional] award, through which the 
tribunal adjudicates Russia’s objection. 
The Rules of Procedure were adopted in the first procedural 
meeting between the Parties on May 20, 2017, with consideration 
given to concepts raised during the meeting.191  Here, Russia may 
still reconsider under these Rules of Procedure whether to 
participate in the proceedings on the merits when it obtains an 
award either rejecting its objection or declaring that its objection 
 
 188 See supra note 184. 
 189  See supra note 153 and accompanying text (showing that the tribunal 
neglected the question of exception (whether or not China’s objections do possess 
an exclusively preliminary character) in its order for bifurcation and reserved the 
matter to be considered and decided in the proceedings on preliminary objections). 
 190 See Dispute Concerning Coastal States Rights in [Several] Seas (Ukr. v. 
Russ.), supra note 176, art. 10(8) (stating “the tribunal shall give its decision in the 
form of award by which it shall . . . declare that objection does not possess an 
exclusively preliminary character”) (emphasis added). 
 191 See generally Dispute Concerning Coastal States Rights in [Several] Seas 
(Ukr. v. Russ.) Procedural Order 3, supra note 180, at 3 (discussing a State’s 
alternatives as arbitral proceedings move forward). 
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does not possess an exclusively preliminary character as a result of 
having contested jurisdiction in a separate proceeding.192  This may 
suggest why Russia changed its stance of non-participation in Arctic 
Sunrise.  However, in order for Russia to participate in the 
proceedings concerning Coastal States Rights for the sole purpose of 
contesting jurisdiction, Russia must ensure a right to bifurcation to 
be granted by a forthcoming Rules of Procedure before the tribunal 
is constituted in order to avoid the routine non-bifurcation in the 
other arbitral cases where both parties participate.  This suggests 
that Russia could have made a deal on this matter with Ukraine not 
long after Ukraine initiated the arbitration against the backdrop of 
the time framework of Annex VII.193  In so doing, Russia may avoid 
the discomfort of no deal after it has appointed its arbitrator.  
Moreover, it is too late for Russia to have such a deal when Russia is 
no longer able to nominate its arbitrator, since participation is less 
meaningful without its own arbitrator. All of which suggest an 
agreement prior to the constitution of the tribunal. Again, due to the 
limited disclosure of proceedings194 we may only infer this early 
agreement. 
In UNCLOS Annex VII arbitration, when parties participate in 
the constitution of the tribunal, the tribunal would maintain 
flexibility with respect to bifurcation, as the tribunal adopts its Rules 
of Procedure providing itself discretion on bifurcation. 195   In 
practice, unless the parties agree on bifurcation,196  the tribunal’s 
 
 192 See Dispute Concerning Coastal States Rights in [Several] Seas (Ukr. v. 
Russ.), supra note 176, aArt. 10(8) (stating “The Arbitral Tribunal shall give its 
decision in the form of an award, by which it shall uphold the objection or reject it 
or declare that the objection does not possess, in the circumstances of the case, an 
exclusively preliminary character.”). 
 
 193 See infra note 240-242 (discussing the 30-day rule on the nomination of the 
arbitrator by the respondent and the nomination of the rest three arbitrators when 
there is no agreement reached by the parties). 
 194 In the first procedural meeting the tribunal also made a procedural order 
regarding confidentiality, by which the information about the proceedings may be 
designated as confidential and subject to non-disclosure.  See Dispute Concerning 
Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.), 
PCA 2017-06, Procedural Order No. 2, 18 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2018), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2270 [https://perma.cc/QV2H-ZJBP] 
(failing to public disclose discuss how the arbitrators were appointed or when the 
arbitral tribunal was constituted—providing minimal to no information). 
 195 See supra note 111-119 and accompanying text. 
 196 One example of such an arrangement is in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, 
in which the parties agreed on bifurcation after the adoption of the Rules but before 
the deadline for the submission of preliminary objections. 
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flexibility terminates upon the rejection of the request to bifurcate.197  
In order to avoid this scenario, a party intending to participate in a 
separate proceeding contesting jurisdiction should pursue a deal 
regarding the forthcoming Rules of Procedure, and this should 
likely occur before the constitution of the tribunal.198  In the two 
cases of non-appearance, the tribunals, pursuant to Article 20 of 
their respective Rules of Court, admitted objections raised in extra-
procedural communications as preliminary objections, and ordered 
bifurcation in each case.199 
4. BALANCING THE ISSUE OF BIFURCATION FOR JURISDICTIONAL 
SENSITIVITY VS. PROCEDURAL EFFICIENCY 
Jurisdictional questions in inter-state disputes are not mere 
technical issues, since by raising questions concerning jurisdiction a 
respondent state indicates “the absence of political agreement that 
the Court should entertain the case.”200  Jurisdictional questions are 
even more significant in cases of non-appearance where the 
respondent contends that the absence of such a political agreement 
was “manifest” by its refusal to appear.201 
Bifurcation has been taken as a proper procedural response to 
address this political sensitivity.  In the Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions case, the Court made the following observation when it 
decided to bifurcate the proceedings: 
Neither the Statute nor the Rules of Court contain any rule 
regarding the procedure to be followed in the event of an 
objection being taken in limine litis to the Court’s 
jurisdiction.  The Court therefore is at liberty to adopt the 
principle which it considers best calculated to ensure the 
administration of justice, most suited to procedure before an 
 
 197 See supra note 124, 127-128 and accompanying text. 
 198 See supra note 192-193 and accompanying text. 
 199 See supra note 144-145, 152-153 and accompanying text. 
 200  See ROSENNE, supra note 13, at 803 (discussing the substantive impact 
jurisdictional questions can potentially have in proceedings). 
 201 See generally Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgement, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 
253, ¶ 4 (Dec. 20) (discussing France’s refusal to accept the Court’s jurisdiction and 
therefore, “the French Government did not intend to appoint an agent, and 
requested the Court to remove the case from its list.”); see also China’s Position 
Paper, supra note 148, ¶¶ 3, 29, 85. 
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international tribunal and most in conformity with the 
fundamental principles of international law. 
For this reason the Court, bearing in mind the fact that its 
jurisdiction is limited, that it is invariably based on the 
consent of the respondent and only exists in so far as this 
consent has been given, cannot content itself with the 
provisional conclusion that the dispute falls or not within the 
terms of the Mandate.  The Court, before giving judgment on 
the merits of the case, will satisfy itself that the suit before it, 
in the form in which it has been submitted and on the basis 
of the facts hitherto established, falls to be decided by 
application of the clauses of the Mandate.  For the 
Mandatory has only accepted the Court’s jurisdiction for 
such disputes. 202 
In the preparation of the Rules of Court of 1922, Judge Anzillotti, 
the sponsor of a draft article on preliminary objection, called on the 
judges to pay attention to the “principle that the question of 
jurisdiction must be decided by a special judgment to be given 
before any procedure on the question as a whole was 
commenced.”203  However, the judges disagreed on the proposed 
principle, either because it was not generally recognized in 
municipal laws, or because preserving procedural flexibility was 
desirable.204  This debate continued in the course of discussion on 
the 1926 revision; the necessity to lay down an absolute rule on 
preliminary objection, which may restrict the Court’s liberty and 
oblige it to consider objections and merits apart, again became the 
center of the debate. 205   Indeed, it has been pointed out that 
municipal laws vary on this matter,206 which seems to indicate that 
in the management of justice, an absolute rule is not demanded.  
Judge Anzilotti, on the basis that questions of jurisdiction in 
international cases differ from those in municipal cases, argued that 
municipal law analogies could not be automatically applied in 
international cases and warned against prejudicing the essential 
 
 202 See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, supra note 29, at 16. 
 203 See Preparation of the Rules of Court of January 30th, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) 
No. 2, at 213 (defining the draft rules submitted by the Drafting Committee). 
 204 See id. at 213-214. 
 205  See generally Acts and Documents concerning the Organization of the 
Court, supra note 46, at 78-94. 
 206 See id. at 81, 82, 85 (discussing the differences in the civil procedure laws of 
Holland, France and Spain). 
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principle of State sovereignty.207  This time, with accumulation of the 
experience of bifurcation in Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions and 
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Judge Anzilotti’s view 
was shared by many others.208  A new Article 38 was added to the 
1926 Rules of Court, based on Judge Anzilotti’s proposal.209  Judge 
Anzilotti unfailingly maintained that the separate handling of 
preliminary objections is the required procedure for international 
cases. 210   This was subsequently confirmed by the Court as the 
objective of Article 38.211 
Since the 1970s, the Court’s handling of preliminary objections 
has raised  efficiency concerns since proceedings on preliminary 
objections has becoming markedly longer.212  The 1972 and 2001 
revisions of the Rules of Court were motivated, in part, to improve 
the Court’s efficiency with respect to the handling of preliminary 
objections. 213   Apart from the technical question of whether the 
proceedings on preliminary objections can be dealt with in a more 
expeditious way, the issue raised a fundamental question whether 
the efficiency of the Court will decline as a result of bifurcation. 
In specific cases, efficiency may be promoted if the court or 
tribunal upholds an objection, resulting in disposal of the case in the 
preliminary phase.  This might contribute to a well-accepted 
perception that bifurcation promotes efficiency. However, concern 
with procedural efficiency under ICJ’s systematic bifurcation is not 
unwarranted, since most bifurcated cases were not dismissed due to 
lack of jurisdiction.  The Permanent Court declined jurisdiction in 
two out of 12 bifurcated cases. 214   The ICJ appears less 
accommodating to jurisdictional objections in the majority of 
 
 207  See id. at 84, 90 (discussing the difference in resolving the question of 
jurisdiction between international and municipal cases). 
 208 See id. at 89-92. 
 209 See id. at 93. 
 210 See Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, supra note 32, at 30. 
 211 See Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) (Ger. v. Pol.), 
Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. Rep Series A15, at 22. 
 212 See Prager, supra note 96, at 156-57 (detailing the number of measure the 
Court adopted in order to increase the efficiency of proceeding by “tight[ing] the 
deliberations in proceedings on preliminary objections . . . [to] inform parties in 
advance of its intended schedule . . . “). 
 213 See id. at 155-56; see also Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 58, at 11 
(discussing “The need to regulate [the] Rule of Court [in] the handling of 
preliminary objection in a more expeditious and rational way . . . “). 
 214 See Shabtai Rosenne, The 1972 Revision of the Rules of International Court of 
Justice, 8 ISR. L. REV. 197, 235 (1973) (discussing the Court declining jurisdiction in 
the case of Mavrommatis (Readaptation) and the case of Phosphates in Morocco). 
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bifurcated cases where preliminary objections were formally 
raised, 215  however, it declined jurisdiction in fewer cases of 
“isolation of jurisdiction,” in which proceedings were also 
bifurcated. 216   That is to say, the majority of the World Court’s 
 
 215 Judgements on jurisdiction and admissibility have been rendered in the 
following cases as a result of raising formal preliminary objections (in those cases 
underlined, the Court declined jurisdiction): Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.); Rights of 
Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.); Ambatielos (Greece v. 
U.K.); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran); Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.); Monetary Gold 
Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. and U.S.); Right of Passage over Indian 
Territory (Port. v. India)); Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.); Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955 
(Isr. v. Bulg.); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain); 
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.); South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. 
Afr.); Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain) (New Application: 1962); Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.; Libya v. U.S.) (discontinued after preliminary objection phase); 
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro); Land and 
Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Eq. Guinea 
intervening); Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo); Legality of Use of Force 
(Serb. & Montenegro v. Belg.); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.); Certain Property (Liech. v. Ger.); 
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.); Application of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.); 
Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between Nicaragua and Colombia 
Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicar. v. Colom.); Alleged 
Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. 
Colom.); Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms 
Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.); Maritime Delimitation in the 
Indian Ocean (Som. v. Kenya).  In Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), preliminary 
objections were formally raised but the parties subsequently agreed to have these 
objections decided together with the merits.  Preliminary objections were also 
raised in the following cases but discontinued at some point in the preliminary 
phase: Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (U.S. v. Bulg.); Compagnie du Port, des Quais et 
des Entrepôts de Beyrouth and Société Radio-Orient (Fr. v. Leb.); Aerial Incident of 3 July 
1988 (Iran v. U.S.); Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (Belg. v. Switz.). 
 216 For the notion of “isolation of jurisdiction,” see ROSENNE, supra note 96 and 
accompanying text.  Judgements on jurisdiction and admissibility have been 
rendered in the following cases as a result of “isolation of jurisdiction”: Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.; Ger. v. Ice.); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.); Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.); 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. 
Bahr.).  Moreover, the Court declined jurisdiction in the following cases of “isolation 
of jurisdiction”: Nuclear Tests (Aust. v. Fr.; N.Z. v. Fr.); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
(Greece v. Turkey); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.); Aerial Incident of 10 August 
1999 (Pak. v. India); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 
2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda); Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to 
Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. India); 
Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and 
to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. Pak.). 
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bifurcated cases contain two-phase proceedings.  In Annex VII 
arbitration, although a majority of cases did not bifurcate 
proceedings, proceedings terminated at the jurisdictional phase in 
only one of four bifurcated cases.217  In any event, efficiency becomes 
a significant issue if the court or the tribunal spends more time in 
two-phase proceedings adjudicating objections and merits 
separately than in a single proceeding in which objections will be 
adjudicated together with merits. 
But this hypothesis is difficult to prove.  After all, it is not 
possible to answer this question in a specific case since the same case 
cannot be adjudicated both with and without bifurcation for 
comparison.  An alternative method to compare the average time 
cost in cases of bifurcation with those of non-bifurcation was 
employed in an empirical study of international investment 
arbitration under ICSID, cognizant that the empirical evidence was 
imperfect.218  This study found that the average time and cost of 
bifurcated ICSID cases was greater than cases of non-bifurcation, 
which is contrary to the accepted view that bifurcation promotes 
efficiency. 219   The discovery illustrates a potential approach to 
answering generic question about the efficiency of bifurcation, in 
light of the great number of ICSID bifurcated cases employing two-
phase proceedings.220 
This alternative method of measurement is not applicable to  the 
ICJ/PCIJ or to Annex VII arbitrations due to the wide divergence 
among the samples which undermines a proper comparison. 221  
 
 217 See Southern Bluefin Tuna Case between Australia and Japan, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 102 (highlighting the frequency with 
which proceedings move beyond the jurisdictional phase).  The other two cases of 
non-appearance (Arctic Sunrise and South China Sea Arbitration, also bifurcated 
cases) each contains two-phase proceedings.  The tribunal decided to bifurcate the 
proceedings in 2018 in the Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea 
of Azov, and Kerch Strait case.  The award on jurisdiction is still pending. 
 218 See Lucy Greenwood, Does Bifurcation Really Promote Efficiency?, 28 J. INT’L 
ARB. 105, 107 (2011) (“[C]ases can vary significantly in terms of factual and legal 
complexity. Clearly, there are many reasons for a case taking a longer time to be 
decided than others, not only whether the case is bifurcated.”). 
 219 See id. at 106-07. 
 220 See id. at 107 (demonstrating that for the cases of bifurcation, ten out of 
forty-five ICSID cases and two out of ten ICSID Additional Facility cases ended at 
the preliminary stage). 
 221  In PCIJ/ICJ, the rule-based, systematic bifurcation simply renders the 
samples for comparison (with a limited number of non-bifurcation cases) extremely 
disproportionate.  The problem of samples for comparison also exists in Annex VII 
arbitration where non-bifurcation becomes overwhelming: only four (Southern 
Bluefin Tuna Case; Arctic Sunrise; South China Sea Arbitration; and Dispute Concerning 
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However, the finding on this question concerning the efficiency of 
bifurcation in the empirical study of ICSID cases is indeed the 
common understanding in PCIJ/ICJ as well as in Annex VII 
arbitration.  In PCIJ/ICJ, the Court itself considered that bifurcation 
would cause unwanted delay when it decided not to bifurcate the 
proceedings.222  Presumably, the parties in specific cases shared the 
same viewpoint when they reached agreement not to bifurcate the 
proceedings. 223   Moreover, a party might decline to raise 
preliminary objections in order to expedite proceedings.224  Notably, 
in Annex VII arbitration, the Philippines in South China Sea 
Arbitration and Ukraine in Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in 
the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait cited “unnecessary delay 
and expense” or “unwarranted delay and expense” to show their 
aversion to bifurcation. 225   Examples of  ICSID practices also 
strongly suggest that these tribunals would not grant bifurcation if 
the request for bifurcation is to be taken as a mere delaying tactic.226 
As the ICJ and Annex VII arbitration are both forums for the 
settlement of inter-state disputes, political sensitivity concerning 
jurisdiction are likely to be similar.  It is also conventional wisdom 
in these forums that efficiency declines as a result of bifurcation.  But 
in the ICJ, since the matter of bifurcation is subject to rule-based 
regulation that has been systematically applied, bifurcation is the 
routine practice of the Court. 227   In contrast, Annex VII arbitral 
tribunals maintain flexibility on the issue of bifurcation in the Rules 
 
Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait) out of 14 cases have 
been bifurcated. 
 222  See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Rep.12 (Oct. 16) 
(illustrating that in the exercise of its advisory opinion, the Court shall also be 
guided by the provisions of the Statute and of these Rules which apply in 
contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable).  See 
also Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs, art. 102(2). 
 223 See generally Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 
Order of Dec. 13, 2000, ICJ Rep. 235-36 (providing an example in which the parties 
agreed not to bifurcate proceedings). 
 224  See Shigeki Sakamoto, The Whaling in the Antarctic Case from a Japanese 
Perspective, 58 JAPANESE YEARBOOK. INT’L L. 247, 248 (2015) (“However, Japan did 
not raise preliminary objections; rather, they implemented litigation tactics by 
contesting the jurisdiction jointly with the merits . . . From this course of action, it 
seems that both Japan and Australia preferred an early decision on the merits so as 
not to harm the generally friendly relations between the two countries.”). 
 225 See South China Sea Arb. Proc. Order No. 4, supra note 150, §2.1; Dispute 
Concerning Coastal States Rights in [Several] Seas (Ukr. v. Russ.) Procedural Order 
3, supra note 180, at 3. 
 226 See Benedettelli, supra note 117, at 502; Greenwood, supra note 218, at 108. 
 227 See supra Part 2.2. 
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of Procedure in the majority of the cases, and in practice these 
tribunals have been reluctant to grant bifurcation.  Why is the matter 
of bifurcation treated so differently in these two forums? 
There are differences between the two forums.  The ICJ is an 
adjudicative body with a standing court, whereas an Annex VII 
tribunal is an ad hoc body.  The cost of an ad hoc arbitration is higher 
for the parties compared with a standing court.228   The Rules of 
Procedure adopted by Annex VII tribunals often contain guidance 
to conduct the proceedings so as to “avoid unnecessary delay and 
expense.”229  Although this is a hallmark of arbitration, it is absent 
from the ICJ Statute or the Rules of Court.230 
Jurisdictional sensitivity in the adjudication of inter-state 
disputes motivated the PCIJ to introduce rule-based bifurcation into 
its article governing preliminary objections in 1926.231  Rule-based 
bifurcation has been retained to the present day in the 1972 and 2001 
revisions to the article governing preliminary objection, 
notwithstanding that the aim of these revisions was to promote 
judicial efficiency. 232   Changes in the two revisions sought to 
expedite proceedings on preliminary objections.233  One explanation 
for this is that the political sensitivity of jurisdictional issues remains 
as high as it was in the 1920s.234  Concerns over efficiency, though 
 
 228 See UNCLOS, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. at Annex VII, 
art. 7 (highlighting that unlike a standing court (e.g. ICJ or ITLOS), the expenses of 
the arbitral tribunal borne by the parties include the remuneration of its members). 
 229 See The Arctic Sunrise Arb. Rules of Proc., supra note 133, art. 10(1); The 
South China Sea Arb. Rules of Proc., supra note 133, art. 10(1).  The Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (PCA) acting with secretarial assistance for most of Annex VII 
arbitration cases (except for the South Bluefin Tuna case in which ICSID provided 
secretarial assistance) provides its model PCA Arbitration Rules containing a 
similar provision.  PCA Arbitration Rules 2012, supra note 117, art. 17(1). 
 230  See ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal, supra note 22, (providing that “[t]he 
proceedings before the Tribunal shall be conducted without unnecessary delay or 
expense.”). It is argued that ITLOS truly functions as an arbitrary body.  Thomas E. 
Robins, The Peculiar Case of the ARA Libertad: Provisional Measures and Prejudice to the 
Arbitral Tribunal’s Final Result 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 265, 276 (2015).  It is noted 
that in seven “normal” cases adjudicated by ITLOS, five of them were cases initially 
referred to Annex VII arbitration but later transferred to ITLOS (or its Chamber) by 
“Special Agreement” reached by the parties.  See generally ITLOS Reports, supra note 
21 (providing a clearer understanding of the various forms arbitral proceedings 
may take). 
 231 See supra note 207-209 and accompanying text. 
 232 See supra note 99-100 and accompanying text. 
 233 See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 234 See SHABTAI ROSENNE, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (2007) 
263 (“Comparison of the Rules of 1978 with those of 1922 will quickly show that 
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real, are secondary at least as far as the issue of bifurcation in the 
standing court of the ICJ. 
An ad hoc tribunal presiding over an inter-state arbitration may 
balance the issues of jurisdictional sensitivity and procedural 
efficiency in deciding whether to bifurcate proceedings.  Whenever 
the parities participate in the constitution of the ad hoc arbitral 
tribunal, to which each of the parties can appoint one arbitrator of 
their own choice,235 jurisdictional issues may be perceived by the 
tribunal as less sensitive between the parties, thus permitting it to 
render a procedural ruling on an ad hoc basis.  This may explain in 
part why in a majority of Annex VII arbitrations where both parties 
participate, the rule on preliminary objection provided the tribunals 
with discretion on the issue of bifurcation.  Indeed, preliminary 
objections have not been raised often in these cases, but whenever 
raised, efficiency concerns appear to prevail as no bifurcation has 
been granted. 
In contrast, when the respondent states refused to participate in 
the constitution of the tribunals in Arctic Sunrise and South China Sea 
Arbitration, the two tribunals were forced to address jurisdictional 
sensitivity.  The tribunals, in the irrespective Rules of Procedures, 
favored bifurcation in principle and bifurcated the proceedings in 
each of these cases in actual practice.236  Nevertheless, this kind of 
balancing of the issue of bifurcation in Annex VII arbitrations will 
put unwilling respondents in an untenable situation: participation 
means less jurisdictional sensitivity and potentially a negative 
decision on bifurcation; non-appearance of the unwilling 
respondent, on the other hand, is thought to deserve bifurcation 
where it can argue exclusively on jurisdiction. Yet the unwilling 
respondent must deprive itself of such opportunity. 
For an unwilling respondent who intends to participate in the 
proceedings for the sole purpose of contesting jurisdiction, a way to 
break this conundrum is to make a deal with the applicant regarding 
the possibility of rule-based bifurcation (before the tribunal is 
constituted).  I infer this possibility in ARA Libertad Arbitration and 
 
they are all case in the same mold, the mold of diplomacy of the 1920s.  The changes 
that have been made do not touch fundamentals”). 
 235 See UNCLOS, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. at Annex VII. 
art. 3(b)-(c). 
 236  In South China Sea Arbitration, the tribunal did so notwithstanding the 
Philippines’ accusation that it would “needlessly prolong and increase the costs” in 
opposing bifurcation.  See South China Sea Arb. Proc. Order No. 4, supra note 150, 
at 4 and 6. 
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Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, 
and Kerch Strait, where the reluctant respondents eventually 
participated in the constitution of the arbitral tribunals. 237  
Ultimately, the apparent sensitivity of the jurisdictional issue in 
these two cases appears to have motivated the tribunals, after 
ascertaining views of the parties, to incorporate a rule-based 
bifurcation (self-contained proceedings on jurisdiction and 
admissibility) into the Rules of Procedure. 
Finally, we get back to South China Sea Arbitration—why was 
China so resolute in deciding nonappearance as the manner of 
rejecting and returning the Philippines Notification and 
Statement?238   It is very plausible that China might have simply 
passed over the idea of making any procedural deal with the 
Philippines when it observed the Philippines’ moves in the initiation 
of the arbitration as being firmly uncompromising.  Above all, there 
had been no substantial exchange of views on the subject matter 
before initiation of arbitration,239 and the stunning suddenness of 
this legal action looked like a legal ambush and appeared 
procedurally hostile. 
The Philippines initiated arbitration two weeks before the 
Chinese Lunar New Year of 2013 (the biggest festival and longest 
national holiday in China).  Annex VII only provided thirty days 
from the receipt of the notification of arbitration for China to prepare 
the nomination of its arbitrator. 240   Given the experience of the 
Philippines’ team, this timing can hardly be taken as a mere 
coincidence.  Against the backdrop of the time framework of Annex 
 
 237 See supra notes 171-175; 191-194 and accompanying text. 
 238 See Letter from PRC to Philippines 2013, supra note 146. 
 239  China made this point in China’s Position Paper on the Matter of 
Jurisdiction.  China emphasized that the two countries agreed in principle that they 
should settle their disputes by negotiation.  See China’s Position Paper, supra note 
148, ¶¶ 30-41, 45-50.  The tribunal cited Chagos Marine Protected Area and Arctic 
Sunrise, which was of the view that “Article 283 then requires that the Parties 
engage in some exchange of views regarding the means to settle the dispute,” and 
“Article 283(1) does not require the Parties to engage in negotiations regarding the 
subject matter of the dispute.”  See The South China Sea Arb. Award on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility, supra note 161, ¶ 333. 
 240 See UNCLOS, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. at Annex VII, 
art. 3(c) (“The other party to the dispute shall, within 30 days of receipt of the 
notification referred to in article l of this Annex, appoint one member to be chosen 
preferably from the list, who may be its national.  If the appointment is not made 
within that period, the party instituting the proceedings may, within two weeks of 
the expiration of that period, request that the appointment be made in accordance 
with subparagraph (e).”). 
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VII, this timing suggests that the Philippines was prepared for no 
agreement on the selection of the three arbitrators under Annex VII 
Article 3(d), in which case they shall be selected by the President of 
ITLOS, 241  who at that time was a national of another country 
pressing the territorial/maritime dispute with China.242  Ultimately, 
the combination of the timing of the filing of the case and the 30-day 
rule is not without significance for China in evaluating the 
circumstances.  This limited lead time presented China with a 
decision of whether or not to approach the Philippines to discuss 
procedures within the 30 days before the constitution of the tribunal.  
This approach, however, given the circumstances, would have been 
impractical. 
5. CONCLUSION 
While both the ICJ/PCIJ and UNCLOS Annex VII tribunals are 
judicial forums for the settlement of inter-state disputes, there is 
great divergence between the rules and practices of bifurcation 
under the ICJ/PCIJ (a standing court) and those of an ad hoc 
arbitration governed by UNCLOS Annex VII. 
At the ICJ, a party is in principle, entitled to raise preliminary 
objections.  If it does so, bifurcation is the resultant procedural 
avenue under the ICJ Rules of Court.243  The matter of bifurcation is 
thus strictly regulated by the Rules of Court (rule-based bifurcation).  
In UNCLOS Annex VII arbitration, the rules of procedure in the 
majority of cases provides tribunals with discretion in deciding 
whether or not to bifurcate proceedings.  In practice, the tribunal’s 
flexibility terminates upon the rejection of the request to bifurcate.  
Bifurcation has been granted in two cases of non-appearance and in 
one case by agreement of the parties—in the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
case. In ARA Libertad Arbitration and Dispute Concerning Coastal State 
Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait, the rule-based 
bifurcation has been adopted in the tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, 
probably at the insistence of unwilling respondent states and with 
 
 241 See id. arts. 3(d)-(e). 
 242  The author does not question the competence or impartiality of Judge 
Yanai of Japan in carrying out his duties to make the necessary appointments as 
President of ITLOS under Annex VII art. 3(e).  Attention to this timing (as it was 
possibly perceived by the Philippines as taking advantage) is paid here to illustrate 
the non-compromising posture of the Philippines. 
 243 See supra Part 2. 
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the cooperation of the applicants prior to the constitution of the 
tribunals.  In the latter case, bifurcation was decided in a procedural 
order, which appeared superfluous in the application of the Rules. 
In Annex VII arbitration, unless a rule-based bifurcation has 
been agreed by the parties prior to the constitution of the tribunal, 
bifurcation is no longer a procedural right for an unwilling state who 
intends to contest jurisdiction exclusively in the first place.  
Bifurcation in the two cases of non-appearance indicates that, by 
depriving parties of the ability to argue jurisdiction in a bifurcated 
proceeding without being deemed to have appeared, the tribunal 
forces parties to elect between the undesirable options of non-
appearance or risking the appearance on a preliminary matter 
without having been granted bifurcation. 
The divergence in practice may be determined by the distinctive 
nature of the two forums (adjudicative/standing court versus 
arbitral/ad hoc tribunal) as decisionmakers balance jurisdictional 
sensitivity against procedural efficiency to decide the issue of 
bifurcation.  In inter-state adjudications by a standing court, 
jurisdictional sensitivity seems to prevail over efficiency, as seen in 
the ICJ’s adherence to rule-based bifurcation, notwithstanding the 
generally accepted belief that the Court’s efficiency declines when it 
bifurcates proceedings.  In contrast, Annex VII arbitral tribunals 
resist bifurcation in favor of efficiency.  Nevertheless, jurisdictional 
sensitivity in inter-state disputes, including UNCLOS disputes, 
remains as high today as it was in the 1920s.  However, although 
Annex VII arbitration is categorized as an arbitral body, it remains 
as an important adjudicatory body in actual nature, standing side by 
side with ICJ and ITLOS for the judicial settlement of UNCLOS 
disputes— proceedings initiated by means of application.244  If the 
essence of an Annex VII arbitral tribunal is closer to that of an 
adjudicative body than arbitral body, the value of rule-based 
bifurcation should be carefully considered. If such is the case, an 
Annex VII arbitral tribunal may ensure the legitimacy of its 
judgments by adhering to the best practice firmly rooted in the PCIJ 
and ICJ since the 1920s: that in the words of Judge Anzilotti, the 
 
 244 See UNCLOS, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. at art. 287 
(showing that under art. 287(5), Annex VII arbitration becomes default if the Parties 
have not accepted the same procedure available under art. 287(1); or, under art. 
287(3), default when no preference has been made with respect to the means of 
dispute resolution available under art. 287(1), according to which the other two are 
ICJ and ITLOS). 
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separate handling of preliminary objections is required procedure 
for international cases.245 
 
 
 245 See Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, supra note 32, at 30 
(drawing observations by Judge Anzilotti). In the first UNCLOS inter-state 
compulsory conciliation case ([2016-10] Conciliation between The Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste and The Commonwealth of Australia), whose proceedings 
became available to public just recently, the practice on bifurcation in this case may 
attract our attention.  This non-binding inter-state dispute settlement procedure 
was initiated by Timor-Leste against Australia pursuant to Article 298(1)(a)(i) and 
Annex V, section 2 of the UNCLOS, the Conciliation Commission retains discretion 
on the matter of bifurcation without necessity to state reasons, see The Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste v. Australia, Rules of Procedure, PCA Case Repository, 
art.17 (Aug. 22, 2016).  However, upon receiving preliminary objections raised by 
Australia, the Commission ultimately delivered the Decision on Competence before 
it moved to the conciliation proceedings on the substance of the dispute.  See The 
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste v. Australia, Decision of Competence, PCA 
Case Repository (Sept. 19, 2016).  The Commission’s Decision on Competence was 
regarded to have binding legal effect notwithstanding the non-binding character of 
conciliation.  See The Timor Sea Conciliation (Timor-Leste v. Austl.), Report and 
Recommendations of the Compulsory Conciliation Commission between Timor-
Leste and Australia on the Timor Sea, PCA Case Repository, para. 66 (May 9, 2018). 
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